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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis applies past research on real options – a right, but not an obligation to take some action on 
a real asset in the future – to a very specific type of real estate development related to Olympic Village 
development.  The Olympics have been previously criticized for the excessive cost of preparation for 
the 16 or 17 day event.  Chicago, if selected to host the 2016 Summer Games, could be faced with 
many of the same challenges of past cities. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is not to provide the final answer to whether a developer should implement 
design flexibility into a project like the Chicago Olympic Village, but rather provide a tool for which to 
analyze the project and areas of uncertainty.  Real Options Analysis (ROA) is presented as a set of 
specific steps that correlate with more commonly used methods of real estate valuation. 
 
In order to determine the optimal sources for flexibility, qualitative research identifies challenges and 
uncertainties of Olympic Village development.  This data is reviewed, analyzed and used to illustrate 
potential sources of flexibility for further analysis.  ROA introduces the use of Monte Carlo simulation 
to better forecast the range of expected outputs and then integrates flexibility at various decision points 
of the project.  The results of this model should allow decision makers for a project to choose the most 
desired path based on the goals and requirements of the project. 
 
It is observed, based on the assumptions used for this analysis, that flexibility “in” and “on” the project 
does create additional value, however this additional value is partially offset by the cost of the flexibility, 
if applicable.  The results also illustrate the benefits of mitigating the downside risk of a project with 
the use of a real option.  The process could provide alternate results with the use of other assumptions. 
 
The analysis of the hypothetical case study also investigates the relationship of two individual real 
options applied to a project simultaneously.  It is determined, through results analysis, that the effect of 
a real option “on” and a real option “in” are virtually cumulative in achieving additional value for each 
type of option. 
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1.0 Introduction and Methodology 
 
A real option as defined by Copeland and Antikarov (2003) is “the right, but not the obligation, to take 
an action (e.g., deferring, expanding, contracting, or abandoning) at a predetermined cost called the 
exercise price, for a predetermined period of time – the life of the option”.  This thesis ventures to 
apply past research on real options to a very specific type of real estate development related to Olympic 
site preparation.  Olympic venue requirements are very specific and differ from those of the private 
market.  As will be discussed further in the paper, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) 
presents a full package of guidelines for Olympic Village design that are optimal for Olympic athlete 
use, but often not as desired by private users of the facility following the Games.  For example, the 
IOC requests that all athletes eat in communal dining facilities, therefore not requiring, nor accepting, 
kitchens or cooking facilities within the athlete suites.  These differences create significant challenges of 
transforming these facilities to their legacy uses.  However, by applying the concepts of flexibility “in” 
the design, or also referred to as “design flexibility”, into the planning of these Olympic venues, real 
options can be created that could help mitigate risk of transformation and subsequent potential 
downside of the development while taking advantage of the upside (potentially more profitable) aspects 
of the project.  All of this could even result in a higher overall expected value of the project. 
1.1 Purpose and Context of Study 
Preparation for the Olympic Games has cost billions of dollars in past years: Beijing - $43b, Athens - 
$8.6b, Sydney – $AUD 6.6b, Atlanta - $1.7b (Demick, 2009; ATHOC, 2004; SOCOG, 2001; ACOG, 
1997).  Now, London and Vancouver find themselves struggling to complete infrastructure and venue 
improvement and development as costs rise high above budgeted amounts while the financial markets 
crash all around the world (Donville, 2009, Pletz, 2009).  Chicago, as a final bidder for the 2106 
Summer Olympic Games, could find itself in the challenging position of figuring out how it will deliver 
the Olympics to the expectations of the IOC and the rest of the world while also creating a vibrant, 
economically advantageous environment for this world class event and its legacy.  The issue of 
financing the Games and specifically venue development is a very important and a particularly timely 
topic.  The topics presented in this study should also be interesting as the proposed Chicago 2016 
Olympic Village is very early in the conceptual design phase when the application of flexibility “in” 
design could be especially useful.  While the idea of hosting the Olympic Games has its supporters and 
non-supporters, if Chicago is selected to host the 2016 event, it will have an effect on virtually everyone 
in the City and potentially the State of Illinois. 
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Olympic venue development is unique in that it is subject to a set of requirements and uncertainties 
that are similar yet differ somewhat from those of other real estate development projects.  As a result 
Olympic venues and the legacy they present have often been targets of severe criticism.  As the 
Olympic Games duration is extremely short, only 16 or 17 days (IOC, 2009), compared to the many 
years it takes to plan for the events, many venues have resulted in underutilized, or even vacant projects 
such as those of the 1976 Montreal Games (Guay, 1996).  This can either result from poor planning, 
changes in market conditions, or a combination of both.  If, however, proper planning is conducted 
during the design phase and flexibility is designed into the project, a “real option” is created which 
allows the owner to take advantage of market conditions at a future time, at a decreased cost to switch 
asset type (i.e. condominium to apartment) (Silver and de Weck, 2007).  In fact, the option minimizes 
the potential downside of the project and should result in an increase in overall project value.  Real 
options can also provide the investor the opportunity to expand and seize the upside benefits by taking 
advantage of the value they created through the initial delivery of the project.  Chicago, if selected, may 
be able to learn from the lessons of cities like Montreal to consider uncertainty in the early conceptual 
design phases and together with flexibility avoid disappointment of such events and venues.  
 
By combining the fields of finance with architecture and design, design flexibility can be analyzed using 
simulation methods to predict the expected investor return and in turn quantify the additional created 
value.  Creation of value should be relevant to virtually all developers, whether public or private, but as 
most funding for the Olympic venue development in the United States comes from private developers 
and local tax financing, this issue is very relevant (Chicago 2016, 2009).  Also, this additional value 
should be able to be realized to limit risk of the projects following the Games. 
 
Olympic related real estate development is also unique in that the developer’s typical opportunity, or 
option, to stall, slow or abandon a project due to market conditions, financing constraints or other 
variables is removed.  As IOC President Avery Brundage said in time of tragedy at the Munich games, 
or as others have used his words during other unfavorable conditions, “The Games must go on!” (IOC, 
2009), and that means that the Olympic Village development, or any Olympic venue, still needs to be 
delivered despite conditions outside of the developer’s control.  This unique requirement provides yet 
another challenge to any developer in assessing the risk associated with Olympic venue development. 
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1.2 Objectives of Study 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze current Olympic bid proposals and plans from the Chicago 
2016 Bid to see whether design flexibility in Olympic venues and sites can be used to create additional 
value.  This thesis not only reviews the past literature on real options, but also how design flexibility is 
viewed by current developers and planners involved with the Chicago 2016 plans as well as those 
involved with past Olympic Village development.  The thesis investigates how additional value, if any, 
created by the real option is quantified.  This process or method is also known as Real Options 
Analysis (“ROA”) and can be quantified through evaluation methods such as Monte Carlo Simulation1.  
The net value of flexibility is then the value created minus the cost of the flexibility. 
 
As Olympic venues have very specific requirements that need to be delivered for the games and often 
do not have long term use in its original form, an adaptive reuse, or switching the project use, type of 
real option provides a great opportunity to maximize value of the asset in an efficient manner.  From 
an investor’s perspective, premiums should exist for a building that can accommodate many uses.  This 
should be especially valuable for a building that is known to change uses shortly after its originally 
intended use is delivered.  There is, however, a cost to providing, or purchasing, the option.  This then 
needs to be compared to the added value to determine if it is advantageous to include the flexibility in 
design.  While the opportunity to exercise the option is far into the development process, the choice to 
include design flexibility, or purchase the option, needs to be addressed very early on in the design 
phase of a project.  With careful planning, however, this assessment can be made and the opportunity 
to realize additional value through flexibility can be achieved. 
 
This thesis reviews ROA literature, along with the advantages and disadvantages of the various analysis 
methods associated with ROA, and then applies ROA to the proposed Chicago Olympic Village 
development case study.  As part of this research and analysis, the main questions this thesis will 
answer are: 
‐ Can flexibility “in” design of Olympic Village development improve the overall expected 
value of these projects? 
                                                 
1 Monte Carlo simulation references Monte Carlo Casino in Monaco but is a method for constructing stochastic or 
probabilistic financial models where many iterations of an analysis are processed with random sampling of various 
inputs.  
11 
‐ How is flexibility “in” the design viewed by private and public real estate professionals for 
Olympic preparation?  Are real estate professionals using real options analysis to evaluate 
the added value of flexibility? 
‐ What value, if any, is created by applying “real options analysis” to a current proposal for 
or completed project of an Olympic venue or site? 
‐ What are worthwhile kinds of flexibility that designers can insert and/or design in the 
project early on to help improve expected economic value? What is that value? Is it worth 
the cost? How do we identify these sources of flexibility? 
‐ What makes Olympic Development different from other Real Estate Development? 
‐ How is the realization of added value applicable to other “short term” use venues or sites? 
1.3 Literature Review Summary 
The main topics that are reviewed for this study are those related to the research in Real Options, the 
retrospective analysis of past Olympic Games and the completed real estate development as was 
required to host the Games.  Chapter 2 provides a broad overview of Real Options and Chapter 3 
focuses on past Olympic Villages and other Olympic Venues as well as an overview of the proposed 
Chicago 2016 Olympic Village project. 
 
There are many past theses, articles and publications that discuss real options and methods for 
analyzing them.  There are also many articles and papers discussing Olympic development and even a 
past thesis that addresses design flexibility for Olympic Stadium development (Jakimovska, 2007).  An 
in depth literature review was conducted to find relationships between these two topics however very 
little literature combines these two areas of past research.  Past literature on each topic does, however, 
provide the necessary background information to set up this study to fully understand what “real 
options analysis” is and how it can be a beneficial tool for evaluating Olympic related projects.  And 
while non-technical literature such as letters, reports, newspapers are not generally used as sources of 
data in quantitative studies, they do play an essential role in grounded theory studies (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990).  It is still important to cross-check the validity of these non-technical sources against 
other sources of data such as interviews and observation. 
 
Existing literature already provides information on the various categories of real options as well as 
specifies the difference between real options “in” and “on” a particular project.  This distinction is 
important to identify as various types of real options are discussed for the Olympic projects.  Although, 
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most of these options are real options “in” the project as they are allowing change of use and adaptive 
re-use, as opposed to the option to build or not build the initial structure. 
 
A few past papers provide a framework for applying the quantitative ROA methods to the projects 
(Barman and Nash, 2007; Babajide et al, 2008).  These studies, among other academic research and 
publications, provide a strong framework on the mechanisms of real options.  Popular media also 
provides significant background information regarding the particular Olympic projects, the players 
involved in those projects, as well as assessments from the public realm on how the projects were 
received by the community. 
1.4 Literature Gap Identification 
Through a comprehensive literature review, it is confirmed that the basis of the study of applying real 
options analysis to Olympic development is new.  It should be noted that even though these two topics 
(Olympic Development and Real Options Analysis) are not new, they have not been combined in a 
formal study.  It is also possible that while past Olympic host cities may have inherently used the ideas 
of flexibility, these cities may not have attempted to quantify the value of the flexibility.  Therefore, this 
research is very investigative in nature and between the new context of the study and the real time 
nature of the Chicago 2016 selection process, some qualitative data is disguised, modified, or noted as 
anonymous at the interviewee’s request. This initial literature review also provides the working 
knowledge to intelligently and effectively question the interviewees as part of the data requirement 
phase. 
1.5 Research Hypothesis 
It is anticipated that developers interested in the Chicago Olympic Village and those involved in past 
Village development have thought about, or even already used, design flexibility for their projects.  
However, it is most likely they did not use ROA as this type of analysis is not yet widespread in normal 
real estate practice.  Design flexibility, when applied to large-scale, important projects, like an Olympic 
Village development, is expected to add value to the project even when analyzed as net of the cost of 
the option.  The introduction of real options is also expected to decrease the downside risk of the 
project. 
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1.6 Overview of Methodology 
The methodology for this study is representative of a common qualitative and quantitative approach 
consisting of two main parts: first using a proven method in social sciences to interview people and analyze 
qualitative data, and second using a financial approach that is transparent in an engineering/design context 
and provides a distribution of results for decision-making about design. 
 
The research for this project began with a thorough literature review of real options and Olympic 
development and is followed up by the first main step of qualitative data gathering method, by 
interviewing key individuals involved with the Chicago 2016 Bid Committee and those previously 
involved with the Salt Lake City Games.  These interviews were targeted at project managers and other 
key planning decision makers for the Olympic Villages of each of those events.  Side conversations 
regarding other Olympic venues, such as the Olympic Stadium, were also evaluated to identify 
common challenges among various types of Olympic venue development. 
 
Since the idea of design flexibility starts early in the planning phase, architects were also interviewed to 
determine how they viewed and valued this flexibility.   Finally, the City of Chicago had recently 
solicited 11 responses from private development firms that are interested in developing the proposed 
Olympic Village, if Chicago is, in fact, chosen to host the 2016 Games.  Part of the data gathering 
method was to interview a few of the responding developers to see what they feel the challenges of 
Olympic Development are, how they are viewing design flexibility for a project of this nature and 
possibly how they could apply ROA to their development analysis. 
 
To prepare for the quantitative second main step, during the interviewing process, one of the goals was 
to obtain project specific data for a proposed or past Olympic Village project.  Another goal was to 
identify sources of uncertainty in the project and specifically discuss flexibility “in” design of the 
project.  The third objective was to determine the current use of real options analysis in the industry 
and specifically for the interviewee’s relevant project. 
 
The remaining data required was quantitative in nature.  One main objective was to gather 
development costs, financing data, operating costs and proposed tax liabilities among other project 
specific information and use this data to analyze the proposed or past development projects to identify 
the potential value creation using real options.  Considering the timing of this project and the fact that 
it is in the middle of an active developer bid process for the rights to develop the site, much of the 
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detailed quantitative data for the proposed project is not available.  Unfortunately, past project data is 
also difficult to obtain.  Instead, assumptions are based on developer rules of thumb, general market 
knowledge and public information regarding the project to create a framework and template for how 
ROA could be used by developers in the future for this type of project.  As a result, much of this data 
was created in order to complete a conceptual analysis of the proposed Chicago 2016 Olympic Village 
project.   
 
A framework for analysis, however, is developed in this thesis and can be used to better quantify the 
areas of uncertainty in the project.  More specific figures can be used in this framework once – and if – 
the data becomes available.  Like other real estate development processes, this analytical process is 
iterative and can continue to be used as development and revenue data becomes more specific and the 
design and planning process move further along.  As observed in recent research on DSM (Design 
Structure Matrix) application to the real estate development process where 91 various development 
tasks are grouped together in six stages based on information required to move on to the next stage, 
the proposed Chicago 2016 Olympic Village project is very early on in the development cycle and in 
fact, only in the first “stage” of the process (Bulloch and Sullivan, 2009).  As the development process 
continues so will the refining of data and subsequent financial analysis of the project. 
1.7 Interviewee Selection and Interview Questions 
To answer the question of how ROA is viewed and how design flexibility is currently used, interviews 
with industry professionals were conducted.  These interviews were with individuals taking an active 
role in the Chicago 2016 Bid and specifically involved in the planning and budgeting for the Olympic 
Village and the Olympic Stadium.  Chicago has already received information from interested 
developers, in response to a City issued request for qualification (RFQ), from eleven private companies 
for the development of the Olympic Village.  Interviews were requested from many of these 
responding firms to determine how they may be viewing design flexibility and how ROA could benefit 
their proposal.  Of the eleven responding developers, six were identified and two were formally 
interviewed.  Additional comments were also received from a third responding firm. 
 
All of the actual interview questions can be found in the Interview Guide in Exhibit A.  While the 
interview guide is used to lead the interviewee, they are written to be slightly more open ended to 
provide opportunity for discussion of the topic and “free response” as the interviewee sees fit.  The 
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goal of the open-ended was to stimulate a series of more specific and related questions and further 
discussion on the topic (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
1.7.1 Procedure 
The process for obtaining data followed the two step methodology as previously discussed.  The first 
was to qualitatively learn about issues that are specific to Olympic venue development and even more 
specifically the proposed Chicago Olympic Village.  During this discussion, the interviewee has the 
opportunity to identify area of uncertainty in this type of project.  The information received was then 
used to encourage discussion with the interviewee on potential opportunities for design flexibility in 
the project. 
1.7.2 Qualitative Data Analysis 
The qualitative analysis uses a procedure called “coding” as discussed in Strauss and Corbin (1990).  
This type of analysis should not only allow the researcher to develop themes in the acquired data, but 
also: 
‐ build theory instead of only testing theory 
‐ help the researcher limit biases and assumptions that can be present during the study 
‐ provide the needed tools to create an integrated theory that mimics reality as best possible 
Through the use of “open coding”, information obtained through literature review, interviews and 
observation is labeled and then categorized.  By categorizing information, it allows for similar 
properties and concepts to be applied to various members of the category, and therefore generalized 
observations and conclusions can made for the category as a whole.  The use of the “coding” system is 
also a beneficial framework of analyzing and identifying “important” opportunities for design flexibility 
in this type of project. 
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2.0 Real Options Overview 
 
Real options theory stems from the ideas of financial options, however the options are used to evaluate 
physical assets instead of financial assets.  As a simple example, land can be considered one of the most 
basic forms of a real option.  By leaving land undeveloped, it naturally creates an option to develop it at 
a later date when a higher profit can be realized.  But the question still exists of when in the optimal 
time to exercise the option and develop the land.  ROA should also provide a solution for this optimal 
timing (Mun, 2006). 
 
ROA, however, is not suited for all projects.  The project needs to face a level of uncertainty and in 
fact, the greater the uncertainty, the more valuable the option actually is.  As almost all projects face at 
least some uncertainty, it is also critical that project decisions can be modified when presented with 
new information.  Project decision makers should also have the ability to make midcourse alterations to 
a plan when uncertainty becomes resolved and can subsequently exercise an option at the appropriate 
time.  If these requirements are not the case, then real options are deemed worthless in the same way 
any option would be worthless if left to expire without execution. 
 
The Net Present Value (NPV) rule2, which is commonly used to make decisions regarding large 
investments, is flawed because it is based on expected future cash flows and fails to account for the 
value of flexibility.  In reality, management will typically have the ability and the option to modify their 
investment decision based on changing market conditions.  The NPV rule does not account for this; it 
assumes 100% commitment at time zero in all projected decisions, which is unrealistic.  For example a 
project could be abandoned after the design phase, expanded if it provided better than expected 
returns, or phased if market demand decreases.  So why would managers disregard the option value of 
flexibility?  While there may be reasons for this lack of consideration, there are many more reasons why 
ROA should become a more embraced method of evaluating a project in the coming years (Copeland 
and Antikarov, 2003). 
 
Using a more traditional Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method, instead of a Real Options approach to 
analyzing a project, will show that DCF will actually observe higher risk in the form of a higher 
                                                 
2 NPV rule is to accept investments that have positive net present value (or the present value of an investment minus 
the initial investment) 
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standard deviation (σ), but a lower overall return.  Figure 2.1 illustrates the comparison of these two 
approaches: 
 
Figure 2.1 – Comparison of DCF and Real Options Analysis Approaches (Mun, 2006) 
 
By applying real options, the downside is mitigated and therefore the risk is reduced.  Real options 
should also provide a higher overall expected return. 
 
Based on this reasoning, real options should be reviewed by developers or investors in response to 
uncertainty in a project.  The fact that any expected performance could change, despite the cause of the 
change, implies uncertainty (Geltner et al, 2007).  Accordingly, this further analysis could be useful as 
uncertainty about a project’s return results in additional risk. 
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2.1 Real Options versus Financial Options 
While real options theory stems from financial options, there are key differences in the two concepts.   
 
Table 2.1 - Comparison between Financial Options and Real Options adapted from Mun (2006) 
FINANCIAL OPTIONS REAL OPTIONS 
 Short maturity, usually in months  Longer maturity, usually in years 
 Underlying variable driving its value is 
equity price or prices of a financial asset
 Underlying variables are fee cash flows, 
which in turn are driven by 
competition, demand, management 
 Cannot control option value by 
manipulating stock prices 
 Can increase strategic option value by 
management decisions and flexibility 
 Values are usually small  Major million and billion dollar 
decisions 
 Competitive or market effects are 
irrelevant to its value and pricing 
 Competition and market drive the value 
of a strategic option 
 Have been around and traded for more 
than three decades 
 A recent development in corporate 
finance within the last decade 
 Usually solved using closed-form partial 
differential equations an 
simulation/variance reduction 
techniques for exotic options 
 Usually solved using closed-form 
equations and binomial lattice with 
simulation of the underlying variables, 
not on the options analysis 
 Marketable and traded security with 
comparables and pricing info 
 Not traded and proprietary in nature, 
with no market comparables 
 Management assumptions and actions 
have no bearing on valuation 
 Management assumptions and actions 
drive the value of a real option 
 
There are, however, cases where real options are similar to financial options.  In both types of options 
a premium, or cost, exists for the option which effectively indicates the option’s maximum loss.  The 
basic types of financial options can also be compared to the various types of real options.  Examples 
are as follows: 
‐ A long call option => An expansion option 
‐ A long put option => An abandonment option 
2.2 Real Options “in” versus “on” Projects 
While real options “on” projects are typically motivated by the desire for investment professionals to 
accurately value opportunities, real options “in” projects are mostly concerned with the “go” or “no 
go” decision of whether to purchase a real option, how to implement the flexibility to create that 
option and finally when to exercise that option.  All of these parts of a real option “in” a project lead to 
a valuation of a project including the option. 
19 
 
The table below illustrates some of the key drivers for each of these types of real options: 
 
Table 2.2 – Comparison between real options “on” and “in” projects adapted from Wang and de Neufville (2005) 
Real options “on” projects Real options “in” projects 
Value opportunities Design flexibility 
Valuation important Decision important (go or no go) 
Relatively easy to define Difficult to define 
Interdependency/Path-dependency less an 
issue 
Interdependency/Path-dependency an 
important issue 
 
Real options “on” projects are also conceptually more closely related to financial options and are 
typically exercised based purely on the value created by the option in the project, regardless of 
technology or design in the project (Guma, 2008).  Real options “in” projects integrate technology and 
design to provide opportunities to acquire and exercise options at a future date.  A simple, yet powerful, 
example of a real option “in” a project is observed in the Targus River Bridge project in Portugal where 
the bridge was originally built to accommodate four lanes of vehicular traffic, however the structure 
was over-built to accommodate future rail and automotive traffic (Gesner and Jardin, 1998).  When 
additional capacity was required, the option was exercised to fulfill that need.  Another exemplar of this 
type of option is present in the HCSC tower in Chicago where vertical expandability was designed into 
the base structure.  Again, this option was exercised when additional space was needed and the building 
was expanded from twenty-nine to fifty-four floors (Pearson and Wittels, 2008). 
2.3 Types of Real Options 
From previous research, seven categories of real options have been identified (Trigeorgis, 1996): 
1. Option to defer 
‐ wait a period of time before resuming operation 
2. Time-to-build option (staged investment) 
‐ can also be viewed as a type of option to phase 
‐ typical in normal real estate development where only sections of a large project are 
built and delivered at one time 
3. Option to alter operating scale 
‐ expand or contract a project that has already commenced or shut down and restart at a 
later date 
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4. Option to abandon 
‐ abandon project and sell the remaining pieces for salvage value 
5. Option to switch 
‐ choice to change the way a product is being built (process flexibility) as well as 
changing what product is being built (product flexibility) and delivered to market (all 
depending on market conditions) 
‐ ex. Oil refinery can be designed to use alternative forms of energy (e.g. fuel oil, as or 
electricity) to convert crude oil into a variety of outputs (e.g., gasoline, lubricants or 
polyester) 
6. Growth options 
‐ future opportunities to grow or expand a project, i.e. un- or under- developed land that 
is part of a larger project 
7. Multiple interacting options 
‐ the previous six categories do not need to stand alone, but can interact with each other 
to create more complex forms of options “in” project 
 
Each of these types of real options is reviewed in projects when attempting to identify design flexibility.  
Not all types will always be applicable to all projects, so each must be considered individually and in 
their more complex, integrated form.  Of these categories developed by Trigeorgis, the option to defer, 
abandon and growth options are categorized at real options “on” a project, while the time-to-build 
option, option to alter operating scale and option to switch, along with interacting, complex options are 
considered real options “in” a project.  As discussed previously, technology and design is therefore a 
more critical component of the options “in” a project. 
2.4 Identifying Design Flexibility 
“Give me a set of requirements today, a timeline and a budget and I will design and deliver the best 
possible product/system/project for you by tomorrow.” (de Weck, 2007)  While this may be the 
mindset of a typical engineer for a large project, it relates very well to that of a real estate developer as 
well.  The typical process for real estate development involves reviewing current market conditions and 
attempting to forecast conditions upon delivery of the project.  However, changes in market conditions 
can be detrimental to the overall returns of a project.  At that point, the ability for a development to 
repurpose a project at a minimum cost can determine how they had viewed design flexibility during the 
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initial planning and design stages of the project and then the ability to implement or act upon the “real 
option” they created through design flexibility. 
 
Design flexibility can be identified through direct or indirect approaches.  It is believed, however, that 
architects and developers already think about design flexibility intuitively when planning for permanent 
long term structures (Barman and Nash, 2007).  This seemed to be the case with those involved with 
Olympic Village and Olympic Stadium development as well (Dickson, 2009; Loewenberg, 2009; Harder, 
2009).  As a result, the direct approach for identifying opportunities and sources of design flexibility is 
assumed to be an appropriate approach for these types of projects. 
 
Indirect Approach              Direct Approach 
Figure 2.2 – Indirect and Direct Approaches to Identify Sources of Flexibility (Cardin and de Neufville, 2009) 
2.4.1 Indirect Approach 
Indirect approaches for identifying sources of flexibility in real estate projects generally question the 
architects and other designers of a project to determine “design variables” and “how they are 
connected”, but less directed at specifically identifying opportunities for flexible solutions in the project 
(Cardin and de Neufville, 2009).  These variables and their relationships are “encoded” in a process 
known as DSM (Design Structure Matrix) and optimized through various algorithms to determine an 
efficient flow of tasks, along with opportunities for real options “in” the project (Cardin and de 
Neufville, 2009; Bulloch and Sullivan, 2009).  
2.4.2 Direct Approach 
The direct approach of identifying sources of flexibility on the other hand is conducted by discussing a 
large scale project with the developers, architects and planners to identify areas of uncertainty which 
can then be used to identify opportunities for flexibility implementation (Cardin and de Neufville, 
2009).  It is found that many of these design professionals are already thinking of flexible solutions “in” 
the project, but have not necessarily identified these opportunities as real options.  In order for this 
22 
direct approach to be successful, it is critical to engage designers early in the design process to identify 
and implement flexible opportunities, as well as ensuring that the design professionals have the ability 
and authority to influence design and make final decisions accordingly. 
2.5 Methods of Real Options Valuation 
There are essentially two different approaches to valuing real options.  As the underlying theory of real 
options is in the financial knowledge of options, typical financial approaches to valuing options, 
including Option Valuation Theory, can be applied.  Per previous research, however, developers are 
typically unlikely to use such a valuation process due to lack of knowledge of the process and 
complexity involved with pricing such an option that only has a limited number of possibilities 
(Barman and Nash, 2007).  Instead, developers would prefer to use the tools they are currently familiar 
with such as Argus or Excel to further value the uncertainties and associated real options for a 
proposed development.  By combining methods from the engineering community, valuation 
techniques such as Monte Carlo simulation can assist in quantifying the value of the option in a real 
estate application.  This method also provides a more simplified method that real estate professionals 
can utilize effectively. 
 
In Figure 2.4 below, a comparison of the various types of analyses can be viewed: 
 
Figure 2.3 – Visual comparison of analysis types adapted from Mun (2006). 
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2.5.1 Financial Approach 
The following financial approaches are presented for comparative reasons, however have their 
limitations for applicable and realistic use by everyday real estate professionals.  This is based on 
interview responses for this study as well as the information obtained in previous research where these 
financial approaches are unlikely to be used by developers (Pearson and Whittels, 2008; Barman and 
Nash, 2007).  The engineering approach, as presented in a later section, provides a method that may be 
more familiar to those real estate professionals looking to value real options. 
2.5.1.1 Black Scholes Model 
Developed by Black and Scholes in 1973, this model provides a solution to value the price of a call 
option but it includes many limitations for its use in real options analysis.  Examples of these limiting 
assumptions include (Copeland and Antikarov, 2003):  
 the option may only be exercised at maturity 
 there is only once source of uncertainty 
 the option is contingent on a single underlying risky asset 
 the underlying asset pays no dividends 
 the current market price is known 
 the variance of return on the underlying asset is constant through time 
 the exercise price is known and constant 
As most real options examples are complex and would require one or more of these assumptions to be 
voided, the Black-Scholes equation would no longer hold.  Also, due to the lack of familiarity of this 
method, it is unlikely to be used in everyday valuation of real estate projects. 
2.5.1.2 Binomial Option Pricing Model 
As another financial approach to valuing real options, the binomial option pricing model is based on 
building a binomial decision tree of potential future values (Copeland and Antikarov, 2003).  In this 
method, probability theory is used to determine an expected “upside” and “downside” outcome at each 
decision point, or period.  A binomial lattice is generated to then determine expected probability of 
particular outcomes for a project.  A very basic example of this type of model can be observed below: 
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Table 2.3 – Example of Binomial Option Pricing Model (Geltner et al, 2007) 
 
As observed in Table 2.3, at the end of one year, there is a potential upside or downside scenario.  Only 
the upside scenario, however, would be exercised, thereby mitigating the effect of the downside 
scenario.  Once the option is purchased, the purchaser can not lose money on the option, except for 
the sunk cost of the option itself.  
2.5.2 Engineering Approach 
Monte Carlo simulation, as an example of an Engineering Approach to valuing options, is a tool for 
financial analysts to evaluate models based stochastic or probabilistic inputs as opposed to traditional 
static or deterministic approaches.  While this approach has been very common in industries such as 
the physical sciences, engineering and even insurance, it has only recently been applied to real estate 
analysis and specifically that of real options analysis.  Commercial software packages and add-ons such 
as Crystal Ball and At Risk provide solutions for performing Monte Carlo simulation, however through 
the use of some basic Excel modeling skills, this simulation can also be integrated or adapted into 
virtually any typical Excel model for real estate analysis and valuation. 
 
Traditional methods of valuation suffer from “the flaw of averages” where the expected, or most 
probable, average of an input is used in a valuation model, disregarding the possibility that there could 
be a large range of probable inputs that make up that average (Scholtes, 2007).  An example of this 
phenomenon is as follows: 
Using an example of a river with an average depth of 30 inches, the question presented is whether one can cross 
the river safely on foot?  The answer is no, but this is not because the average 30 inch estimation of expected 
25 
depth is incorrect, but rather that the average fails to exclude any potential holes in the bottom of the river that 
may exceed 6 feet and therefore unable to be traversed (Adapted from Scholtes, 2007). 
 
This same issue is often seen in real estate analysis when inputs are based on averages of expected 
values.  By using Monte Carlo simulation, a range of values are used an inputs to the model and a range 
of probabilistic results are obtained. 
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3.0 Olympic Villages and Other Olympic Venues 
 
The Olympic Games, originally created in approximately 776 B.C., can be traced back to the ancient 
plains of Olympia, Greece, where they continued for nearly 12 centuries until Emperor Theodosius 
banned “pagan cults”.  At these ancient games, “imposing temples, votive buildings, elaborate shrines 
and ancient sporting facilities” were combined to create the venue and community for the Olympic 
Games (IOC, 2009).  It was not until 1896 though that the Olympic movement was again created and 
the first modern Olympic Games were held in Athens, Greece (IOC, 2009).   
 
First conceived for the 1902 Paris Games and since modified, the Olympic Charter now reads: 
“With the objective of bringing together all competitors, team officials and other team personnel in one place, the 
OCOG shall provide an Olympic Village for a period determined by the IOC Executive Board.” – Olympic 
Charter (IOC, 2007) 
 
With this being clearly stated as not just a goal, but as a requirement of hosting an Olympic Games, the 
Olympic Village is a critical component of delivering a successful event.  The Olympic Charter also 
goes as far to express the desires of what the Olympics will bring to all those involved: 
"Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and 
mind. Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy found 
in effort, the educational value of good example and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles." – 
Olympic Charter (IOC, 2007) 
 
These same principles must be integrated and evident in every aspect of the Games, including the 
venues for which the Games are housed. 
 
Due to the Olympic Movement and its motive to make the Games a “world” event, it makes it almost 
impossible for the Games to be held in the same city more than once.  Only three cities have held the 
games twice (Paris, London and Los Angeles), and even then the events were held a minimum 24 years 
apart in each city (Millet, 1997).  With that being said, it is very difficult to build the Olympic 
infrastructure and particularly the Olympic Village to be used for purely an Olympic use. 
 
Many past Olympic host cities have built great venues that instill the values of the Games, but years 
later some of these venues sit vacant, abandoned and in disarray, or with hefty financial tabs that are 
the public’s responsibility, because there was little use for them following the events.  Examples of 
these are: 
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 1976 Montreal venues 
Significant debt for Olympic venues was not paid off until 2006.  Additionally, various 
facilities are abandoned due to lack of interest or other use.  The Velodome was 
converted to a Biodome which is a center dedicated to ecology and environment and a 
very questionable occupant of a large sports venue. (Guay, 1996) 
 2008 Beijing Stadium 
“The National Stadium, known as the Bird's Nest, has only one event scheduled for 2009: a 
performance of the opera "Turandot" on Aug. 8, the one-year anniversary of the Olympic opening 
ceremony. China's leading soccer club backed out of a deal to play there, saying it would be an 
embarrassment to use a 91,000-seat stadium for games that ordinarily attract only 10,000 spectators. 
The venue, which costs $9 million a year to maintain, is expected to be turned into a shopping mall 
after several years, it owners announced last month.” – (Demick, 2009) 
 2000 Sydney Stadium and Olympic Park 
 2004 Athens Stadium 
 
Other cities on the other hand have been able to create great value out of some of their venues.  In 
Atlanta, the main Olympic Stadium was designed and developed with the full intention of converting it 
to become the new Atlanta Braves stadium.  With some forward thinking and up front design, 
flexibility was created in the structure to allow for this conversion from an Olympic use to a post-
Games use to occur in an efficient manner. 
3.1 Examples of Past Olympic Villages 
The first modern Olympic Village was constructed for the Los Angeles Games in 1932 in the Baldwin 
Hills neighborhood of Los Angeles, California.  This Village consisted of several hundred buildings 
including not only residential areas for athletes, but other amenities such as a bank, amphitheatre, 
hospital, and post office.  This Village was not expected to survive past the Olympics and was 
dismantled just after the Games (Xth Olympiad Committee, 1933). 
 
Olympic Villages have since been delivered in many different forms from utilizing virtually all existing 
facilities in Los Angeles for the 1984 Games to creating alliances with established institutions in Atlanta 
and Salt Lake City (ACOG, 1997; SLOC, 2002) and building entirely new neighborhoods in a “new 
urbanism” effort to revitalize an area of the host city (Barcelona, 1992 and Sydney, 2000).  Lake Placid, 
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1980 even went to the extreme of using a newly built medium security prison as part of its Olympic 
Village in an effort to provide a safe and secure facility for the athletes.  In finding comparative cities 
and sites for the proposed Chicago 2016 Village, it is important to understand the differences between 
the National Olympic Committee’s (NOC) policies in the United States versus those in other countries.  
Unlike most other host cities, there are no national subsidies for the project.  Chicago instead will rely 
virtually entirely on private financing through a private developer (Chicago 2016, 2009).  Therefore, 
Salt Lake City and Atlanta were reviewed to see if there were any “lessons learned” that could be 
applied to the Chicago site.  As discussed below, it was realized that the Salt Lake City and Atlanta 
Villages were very different from the proposed Chicago Village mostly due to the fact that their legacy 
use was already established prior to the Games.  For this reason, Barcelona was briefly researched as 
another example of the “new urbanism” model that Chicago may attempt to recreate or follow. 
3.1.1 Salt Lake City Olympic Village 
The Salt Lake City Olympic Village overview is based on interviews with John McNary, Director Campus Design and 
Construction, University of Utah and Jane Cady Wright, President and CEO, Hanbury Evans Wright Vlattas + 
Company and Lead Designer on the Salt Lake City Olympic Village. 
 
Salt Lake City established its Olympic Village on approximately 64 acres within the confines of the 
University of Utah campus by utilizing existing dormitory and institutional buildings while also 
developing new buildings that would serve as new student housing facilities following the Olympics.  
Existing buildings included approximately 22 historic properties that were rehabilitated and integrated 
into the master plan for the Village.   Legacy use for all the buildings included student dormitories 
along with a community center, dining halls, and common use facilities. 
 
There are many reasons why this Village was an extreme success but it is mostly due to the fact that the 
legacy use of the Olympic facilities were well known during the design and planning stages.  In fact, 
even though the idea of developing the new buildings was initiated with the premise that they would 
serve the Olympics, the design process looked at the new facilities in exactly the opposite form.  
Instead, the buildings were designed specifically for the University of Utah’s use and then the plan was 
adapted to see how the Olympic use and requirements would fit that design and plan.  This process 
ensured the University of Utah would be left with venues that were well designed and efficiently met 
their needs. 
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While the Salt Lake Village was not required to have the same type of flexibility as may be required of 
other Olympic venues, there were still some requirements for the Olympics that were not needed for U 
of Utah.  One example was the “disco”, a bar or nightclub, that was created for the Village in old 
warehouse space.  This “disco” was broken down and the warehouse was returned to its original use 
post Games. 
 
One of the largest advantages this site had to achieve success was the ability to operate all venues for a 
full year prior to delivering it to the Olympic Committee.  This led to a challenging problem of locating 
temporary housing for all of the students during the Olympics, but by finishing the project one year 
before the Games allowed the users to work out the “kinks” before the athletes arrived. 
3.1.2 Atlanta Olympic Village 
Atlanta was another example of an Olympic Village that was built with an institutional partner in 
Georgia Tech University and Georgia State University and was located on the campus of the Georgia 
Institute of Technology.  This site was selected for a variety of reasons including the university’s ability 
to provide “many suitable facilities for the Games, especially in the areas of housing, dining, recreation 
and training” (ACOG, 1997) This included the use of approximately 200 permanent facilities on the 
campus and approximately 270 acres of Georgia Tech’s campus. 
 
It was the goal of the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games to provide a completely secure and 
self-contained community that offered a full range of amenities for the residents.  Members of the 
ACOG even visited the Barcelona Olympic Games in 1992 to observe the Village and help identify 
both the physical and operational requirements for the Atlanta Olympic Village (ACOG, 1997)  A few 
new facilities were required and built to accommodate the Olympic Village including one 8-story 
building and one 13-story building constructed on the southeast corner of the campus.  These facilities 
were used and managed by Georgia State University after the Olympic Games. 
 
Overall delivery of the Olympic Village was a joint effort between Georgia Tech and ACOG: 
 
“In order to develop the permanent facility infrastructure required by the Olympic Village and to make long-
term improvements to the Georgia Tech campus, the Board of Regents undertook construction of new housing 
projects, numerous housing renovation projects, and the Georgia Tech plaza, an attractive, new, open area that 
was the main gathering place in the international zone.” (ACOG, 1997) 
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“Probably the most demanding challenge facing ACOG in connection with the Atlanta Olympic Village 
involved building approximately $17 million worth of temporary and portable structures in 16 days to transform 
the Georgia Tech campus into a completely secure and functional Olympic Village.” (ACOG, 1997) 
 
After the Games, Georgia Tech was offered to purchase the temporary facilities for their sole use going 
forward. 
3.1.3 Barcelona Olympic Village 
Barcelona used the motivation of “new urbanism” to create a new mixed use village that would stand 
as a vibrant community long after the Olympic Games concluded.  As part of this vision, they created 
the Parc de Mar area which served as the Olympic Village during the 1992 Summer Games. 
 “Apart from the facilities in the Montjuïc Olympic Ring and the Vall d'Hebron, the Barcelona Candidature 
had made plans for urban development in what was to be another large Olympic area for the Barcelona of 1992: 
the Parc de Mar, in Poblenou, where the Olympic Village for the athletes and team officials who would be 
coming to the Games was to be built. Initially the sheer size of this development aroused doubts and reticence 
and it was suggested that alternatives should be sought to cover the Olympic accommodation. In the end, however, 
it was decided to forge ahead with the studies and the planning of Parc de Mar, which would open up the city to 
almost five kilometres of coastline.” – (COOB’92, 1992) 
 
A Special Development Plan for the Barcelona Seafront was approved by the City Council in which it 
contained “a number of central, interlinked proposals for one of the most important steps in the 
creation of the Barcelona of the future.”  These proposals included “the construction of a new area 
which would serve as the Olympic Village and would then be destined for residential use after the 
Games, the opening up of the city to the sea, and the reorganization of the road system. (COOB’92, 
1992)” 
 
“Even more impressive was the legacy of the Olympic Games of the XXV Olympiad in Barcelona in 1992. 
The city was literally transformed; its front on the sea was opened up and accentuated…” (Synadinos, 2002). 
 
The newly developed area of the Parc de Mar turned out to be a tremendous success for the City of 
Barcelona, even with overcoming many challenges with the recovery of the Barcelona coastline for the 
project.  In the end, the Parc de Mar was able to provide a new area for the city that was highly 
desirable to Barcelona residents (COOB’92, 1992). 
3.2 Examples of other Olympic Venues 
3.2.1 Atlanta Olympic Stadium 
The Atlanta Olympic Stadium is an excellent example where thoughtful planning of a new Olympic 
venue proved to be a very successful project.  This stadium was designed and built to accommodate the 
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needs of the Olympic athletes and the Olympic Organizing Committee, but by building in flexibility, 
the stadium was easily and efficiently transformed into the new Atlanta Braves home baseball stadium 
following the Games.  As presented in a recent study on flexibility in stadium design, the Atlanta 
Olympic Stadium was originally constructed to hold 80,000 spectators, but was reconfigured and 
downsized from an athletic stadium to a baseball stadium to hold 50,000 spectators (Jakimovska, 2007).  
This conversion allowed the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games to elude the situation of 
having another overpriced Olympic white elephant on their hands, and instead provided a facility that 
has since been used by over 30 million people since the Games (Sandomir, 2005).  
3.3 Proposed Chicago 2016 Olympic Village Plan 
The information in this section has mostly been obtained from the Chicago 2016 Bid Book, unless otherwise noted, which 
was distributed to the IOC and general public on or around February 12, 2009. 
 
Chicago 2016’s goal for the proposed Olympic Village is to transform an underutilized hospital campus 
of approximately 52 hectares3, or 128 acres, on Chicago’s near South side to a new “urban, compact” 
neighborhood for the 2016 Games and beyond.  This proposed village would provide a “unique 
experience in the middle of the City” for the 16,000 athletes and team officials during the Games as 
well as an entirely new community for many years following.  As part of the Bid process, the village has 
been conceptually designed to consist of 21 residential buildings or approximately 12 stories each, 
totaling approximately 3 million square feet along with a lakefront park and private beach for Village 
residents.  The Village is designed to integrate into the existing city fabric while providing a “congenial, 
pedestrian friendly setting” designed around a Main Street and the Olympic Village Plaza that links all 
of the most important functions. 
 
                                                 
3 one hectare = approximately 2.47 acres 
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Figure 3.1 – Proposed Plan of Village, Olympic Mode – Chicago 2016, 2008 
 
3.3.1 Project Design 
The overall Olympic Village project is proposed to consist of similar buildings that will feature a 
modular floor plan that can be adapted to accommodate either Olympic offices or residential housing.  
This modular design is also expected to facilitate future conversion into market rate and affordable 
housing after the Games.  Figure 3.2 visually represents the similarity currently being proposed for the 
residential structures.  This current design could prove to be an issue as the “IOC favors buildings not 
more than 14 stories tall, while developers have favored much larger towers for condos near the 
lakefront to maximize their returns” (Pletz, 2009). 
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Figure 3.2 – Proposed Olympic Village residential structures – Chicago 2016, 2008 
 
Building on Chicago’s “long history of progressive urban planning and world-class architecture”, the 
latest technologies and environmentally sustainable designs are scheduled to be incorporated into the 
overall design of the project.  This goal correlates well with the global initiative of the Bid to promote 
the “Blue-Green Games”.  With this initiative, Chicago 2016 is interested in showcasing the seamless 
integration of environmental innovation and technologies throughout the Games. 
3.3.2 Details of Accommodations 
Residential accommodations in the Village will provide approximately 17 square meters4, or 183 square 
feet, of gross living space per resident while providing a convenience variety of amenities in a mixed-
use community atmosphere.  The IOC prepares a technical manual for the Olympic Village that 
architects use as the “program” for design.  A few of the specific details of design that are integrated 
into the Chicago Olympic Village are as follows:    
‐ no more than 2 residents per bedroom 
‐ maximum resident/bathroom ratio of 4:1 
‐ single rooms will also be provided for “chefs de mission” 
‐ total of 600 single rooms and 8124 double rooms will accommodate 16,800 bed spaces 
‐ single bedrooms will be 13.5 sq meters and double bedrooms will be 13.5-19 sq meters (exceeds IOC 
technical manual requirements) 
‐ units will have individual thermostatic controls and extra sound insulation within walls and between floors 
 
                                                 
4 one square meter = 10.8 square feet 
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The IOC requirements for the Olympic Village are very specific and not necessarily transferable to the 
private market for the legacy use of the facilities.  As a result: 
 
 “Much of the housing, which must be designed and built in just six years, will have to be reconfigured between 
the time the athletes use it and private owners take possession. A typical two-bedroom condo will require 
temporary walls so it can house eight athletes in four bedrooms. Kitchens will either be walled off or rendered 
inoperable because the IOC doesn’t allow athletes to eat outside the dining hall. Athlete facilities such as an 
amphitheater and nightclub will be temporary, as well.” (Pletz, 2009) 
 
All of these issues present additional challenges to a project of this nature and will be discussed further 
in the next chapter. 
3.3.3 Financial Requirements and Assumptions 
The proposed Chicago Olympic Village is unique to most other countries proposed Villages in that no 
national subsidies are provided for the 2016 Games.  This provides additional challenges with financing 
and guaranteeing a project of this size, however the City of Chicago has agreed to support the site with 
a tax increment financing (TIF) subsidy that would fund infrastructure and other significant 
improvements.  The City will also transfer the site to a private development team that will be required 
to deliver the Olympic Village to meet the requirements for both the Olympic Games and the City of 
Chicago.  Upon executing this transfer, the development team is expected to be required to provide a 
guarantee for timely completion of the construction. 
 
The overall development budget for the project is currently estimated at $976.6 million and would be 
privately financed by the development team.  Olympic revenues are expected as CHICOG will lease 
the residential buildings in the Village for a total of ten months (before and during the Games).  This 
rent is calculated to cover the development team’s carrying cost during the rental period, estimated at 
$44.1 million, but will be no more than market rate rental costs.  There has also been recent news 
suggesting that the City of Chicago may provide some type of guarantee for the Olympic development, 
but this has not been confirmed to date (Hersh, 2009). 
3.3.4 Project Development 
Chicago 2016 has already received responses from various development teams interested in the 
Olympic Village project and should select a team shortly after the IOC announces its selection in 
October, 2009.  The development team will be selected to build the residential portion of the Village 
and to convert the residences to a new community following the Games where they will have direct 
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responsibility for the design and construction of the Village.  The City of Chicago and CHICOG will 
still maintain involvement by overseeing construction and monitoring progress to ensure compliance 
with the schedule and physical requirements.  As a note, the private development team will not be 
responsible for the temporary structures on the site. 
 
Development of the Village is expected to begin in 2012 and be completed by the end of 2015.  During 
this time, the permanent residential structures will be built on the site to provide housing and office 
space for athletes and officials during the Games.  These units will be pre-leased or pre-sold for new 
residents to occupy the spaces after the Games.  Temporary facilities will also be constructed and when 
dismantled it will provide the private developer with the opportunity to add additional residential or 
commercial space for the Village.  Chicago 2016 does anticipate a strong market response to the 
development as a previous Olympic Village. 
3.3.5 Post Olympic Use 
The plan for the Chicago Olympic Village is to transition it to a mixed-income, residential community, 
establishing an exciting new neighborhood on the near South Side.  This is aligned with the City of 
Chicago’s long range plans as the Village should act as a catalyst for the transformation of the City’s 
near South Side.  City of Chicago has, in fact, already approved rezoning of the site for development of 
the Village and a future lakefront mixed-use community.  The City even expects this development 
project will occur whether or not Chicago is selected for the 2016 Games. 
 
It is the City’s objective for this new neighborhood to attract new business and retail establishments 
after the Games.  With a mix of market rate and affordable units divided into condominiums and 
apartments and even a number of buildings targeted to seniors and students, the neighborhood would 
be the home of people of a variety ages and backgrounds.  Also, with Paralympic considerations, “all 
streets, plazas, sidewalks and the lake promenade will be designed according to applicable accessibility 
standards, providing barrier-free access for all residents.” 
 
It is apparent that the detailed requirements of the Olympic Village would provide significant 
challenges to a project of this type.  Many of these issues will be discussed further in the next Chapter. 
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4.0 Challenges of Olympic Development 
 
There are many differences between Olympic Development and Real Estate Development in general, 
however the most significant difference is related to the scale and visibility of the two types of projects.  
Olympic venue development projects have many of the same characteristics as those of other more 
typical large scale, important projects, but these issues are elevated to an even higher level due to the 
world stage on which they sit.  
 
Research on the challenges of large scale, important projects has been compiled and in a briefing paper 
by de Neufville and Scholtes (2006) large projects are identified as having the following characteristics:  
‐ More likely to be salient politically at the national or even international level, and thus sensitive to 
idiosyncratic changes in national priorities and public pressures 
‐ Subject to much greater uncertainties – not only politically, but also associated with market fluctuations, 
technological change, and the organizational complexity of the special purpose consortia set up to run the 
project – over their extended lifetime 
‐ Likely to have significant impacts on the sponsoring organizations. Indeed, the main sponsors of any large 
project will have limited ability to spread the risks over many projects, and are more likely to be ‘betting 
their company’ or their reputations on the major project. 
These points are reviewed in the context of Olympic development and are determined to be applicable 
to this type of development.  The characteristics are further reviewed in the following discussion of the 
unique challenges of Olympic development. 
4.1 Differences between Olympic Development and Real Estate Development 
The following quote from a developer interested in the Chicago Olympic Village loosely sums up the 
challenges involved with such a development: 
“The rest of the world would probably think getting into Olympic development looks like deciding it's OK to go 
rowing with the Marquis de Sade to the middle of the lake during a storm after dark for one's first swimming 
lesson. Of course there are a number of developers that have a different perspective because otherwise they 
wouldn't be developers.” (Anonymous, 2009) 
 
With this being said, it is very important to understand the differences between Olympic Development 
and other types of real estate development.  The following discussion of these key differences is 
compiled based on interviews with a few of the Chicago developers that are interested in the proposed 
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Chicago 2016 Olympic Village project.  A few points were also either acquired or confirmed through 
public press and review of past Olympic Villages in Salt Lake City, Atlanta and Barcelona. 
4.1.1 Suggested IOC Venue Requirements 
One of the first points to be made by each of the interviewed individuals involved in Olympic 
development is the difference between IOC and private market requirements.  The IOC provides a 
technical manual that is unfortunately not available to the public, however it addresses the desired 
requirements of the Olympic Village design.  In it, it answers key planning questions such as how big a 
room has to be, would should the ratio of the size of buildings and amenities be per athlete, how many 
bathrooms should be provided and how quickly should athletes arrive via vertical transportation.  Like 
many typical projects, this manual serves as the program for the building, but what makes the design 
especially interesting is then altering the design for convertibility of the venue to later uses.  It is the 
architect or designers goal to keep the transition to a minimum and the resulting expense to a 
minimum. 
 
The ability to design to the IOC criteria while also satisfying the post-Olympic market criteria such as 
good unit size, good bedroom size, etc. is a very complicated and challenging task.  At a minimum, the 
design should allow for convertibility while minimizing the modification to any main structural or 
mechanical pieces.  One example of this type of design that was suggested was the planning for 
different unit sizes and unit types.  Looking at the sizing in terms of bays, if the design can keep 
structural elements like all building envelope and core components, as well as demising partitions 
between units in place and then also have mechanical (HVAC and plumbing) systems either roughed in 
or in place for the future use, this allows for a much easier conversion to other uses.  The designer 
should always keep the following question in mind when laying out the Olympic plan: “How does the 
entire Olympic suite relate to a future unit?” 
 
Another example of how IOC guidelines differ from that of the market requirements is that the 
Olympic use can not have kitchens in the units.  This evolves from the desire for athletes to eat 
together in communal dining rooms and facilities, which are also available in the Olympic Village.  To 
address this issue, the developer may choose to possibly install plumbing for future kitchens, install 
part of the kitchen without installing the appliances, or even build the kitchen and wall it off so it is not 
available for use by the athletes.  Each of these options has a different cost and complexity that would 
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need to be evaluated.  The ability to build more than is needed up front and have it available for use 
following the games should be questioned and investigated. 
 
As a final example, the requirements for elevators drastically differ for the varying uses.   The number 
of elevators and size of elevators both need to accommodate the athlete traffic during the Olympics to 
meet IOC requirements, but would be overkill for a private residential building.  The ability to be able 
to reclaim some of the vertical transportation for the post-Olympic use could prove economically 
advantageous if designed properly. 
4.1.2 Security 
The next challenges involve the security of the Village and the requirements during and post Games.  
In an archetypical mixed use real estate development, designers are typically looking to bring people 
into the development and integrate it with its natural surrounding neighborhoods.  But, due to high 
security of an Olympic Village, the project needs to have defined perimeters.  While many of these 
security perimeters may be temporary in nature, the project still needs to layout to allow for centralized 
use of services in the congregating areas for athletes. 
 
How this transforms to the public market following the Games is a challenge as a developer of this 
type of project probably wants integration with the surrounding community and its services.  Beijing 
2008 can be used as an example of how this challenge still faces the community today, almost a year 
later.  In a recent trip to the site, a visitor observed the “compound” that was built for the Beijing 2008 
Olympic Village where the guards were still present to provide security to the enclosed “community” 
(Loewenberg, 2009).  Whether this was a desired outcome for the venue or its one that can not be 
avoided is unknown, but it still exists as a challenge to meeting these various goals.   
 
The Village in the end, at least in Chicago’s case, needs to integrate with the surrounding community.  
A new village with the exclusive nature of a “gated community”, especially in part of Chicago proposed 
for the Village, would most likely not be accepted by the market (Loewenberg, 2009).  The Olympic 
Village model, however, requires a tightly centered community in order to provide all of the amenities 
to the athletes in immediate proximity, where a naturally created neighborhood would typically find 
these amenities dispersed throughout the neighborhood. 
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4.1.3 Delivery Schedules/Guarantees 
This challenge stems from the issue that Olympic projects are required to be delivered despite changes 
in market or other conditions that may be out of the developer’s control.  Unlike those of other 
countries and Olympic Games, this Village is anticipated to be fully financed by a private developer and 
is not expected to receive any type of national subsidy.  Recent press addresses this issue as the other 
2016 bid cities (Madrid, Rio de Janeiro and Tokyo) are offering full government guarantees (Bergen 
and Hersh, 2009).  Certain costs of the project will be borne by the Chicago Committee for the 
Olympic Games (CHICOG) or the City of Chicago via TIF financing, however all other financing and 
delivery risk will be the developer’s responsibility.  This is very different from a typical real estate 
development project where the developer would have the option to delay or abandon a project if 
conditions deem it unfavorable or nor longer profitable.   
 
With recent changes in Chicago 2016’s perspective on meeting the IOC’s requirement to provide a 
financial guarantee, the City of Chicago may offer a guarantee for the Games, however the level of 
guarantee that may be presented directly for the Olympic Village is still unknown (Hersh, 2009).  If a 
guarantee is put forward for the Village, this would create an interesting real option that would be 
similar to a put option on the project that would limit the downside exposure of the project (Trigeorgis, 
1996). 
4.1.4 Political and Visibility Issues 
The nature of this type of project being large scale, extremely important and visible to the public 
introduces additional challenges for Olympic development.  The early planning for the Chicago 
Olympic Village has already attracted many “interest” groups looking to benefit their cause and lobby 
their goals for the project.  For example, affordable housing groups may want to see a higher 
percentage of post-Olympic units as affordable, while ADA interest groups may want to see high 
standards of accessibility planned for the project and environmental and sustainability focused groups 
want all units to be delivered at “green”.  Unfortunately, all of these considerations not only have costs, 
but may conflict with each other or those of the market requirements as a whole.  While this is an 
extreme example, balance of all of these forces must be met, while still achieving a financially 
sustainable project. 
 
With these challenges being identified, there may also be benefits to having the backing of the City and 
the Olympic Committee for such a high profile project.  For example, the permitting and planning 
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process may be expedited as a result of the delivery requirements and guarantees.  Restrictions on 
flexible design may likely be less of an issue in a visible project.  In the recent example of the BCBS 
building in Chicago, the developer was able to implement a vertical expansion option into the design 
which left either redundant or incomplete systems in the building.  Even though all life safety issues 
were addressed and completed for the initial phase of this development, the City has been hesitant to 
allow this type of option in other residential projects in the City (Anonymous, 2009).  If an option of 
this sort were to prove valuable and mitigate downside risk of a project, the City may be more 
amenable, especially if it were providing a guarantee, to allowing flexibility to be built into a project. 
4.1.5 Duration of Use 
The building use for this project is extremely different from a typical project that is developed.  
Investment properties may have an expected duration of use of 30, 40 or 50 years, while institutional 
users may even plan for durations of upwards to 100 years.  An Olympic project, on the other hand, is 
designed to specific requirements that are utilized for a very short term; only 16-17 days for Olympic 
Games and then possibly an additional few weeks for the Paralympic Games.  Integration of temporary 
facilities assists the effort to meet many of the short term goals of the Games and its venues, but all 
facilities can be temporary.  This issue again suggests the need to create an efficient process for 
transforming facilities following the Games to their legacy uses. 
4.1.6 Timing of Project 
The development schedule for a project of this size presents a challenge as well.  As the Bid Book 
currently suggests, planning would begin in mid-2010 with construction actually beginning in 2012, but 
unfortunately there is a fairly long duration until any revenue from the project is realized.  The 
Olympics in 2016 would generate rents for the facilities as they are leased by CHICOG, however the 
entire project is being delivered at the exact same time.  Typically, for large, multi-use project like the 
proposed Olympic Village, developers only spend the amount of capital as is required to start creating 
revenues on a project.  The project then continues to be developed using revenues from other “parts” 
of the development.  Additionally, the “real” revenue for this type of project is not realized until after 
the Olympics when the project is converted to its legacy use and then absorbed by the market.  
Because of this situation, it may be beneficial for the developer to consider legacy uses that come to 
market quicker such as “bulk” selling larger sections of the project or even below market, or affordable, 
housing units that are absorbed very quickly. 
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4.1.7 Scale of Project Delivered to Market 
The size of these types of projects is significantly larger than most projects being delivered to a market 
in a single phase.  As an example, Chicago may typically see absorption of 2500-3000 units per year, but 
this is for the entire City of approximately 146,000 acres.  The proposed site for the Chicago Olympic 
Village is only approximately 128 acres and proposing to deliver upwards of 2500 units to market.  It is 
expected that absorption for this area could be as high as 500-600 units per year, but even that 
assumption is aggressive.  Instead, the developer needs to figure out potential other uses to be able to 
deliver larger “chunks” to the market at one time in the form of student housing, senior housing, hotel 
or other uses, or look for opportunities to minimize carrying costs while phasing a project in a more 
traditional market delivery. 
4.1.8 Unknown Future Legacy Use 
One of the biggest uncertainties of an Olympic project is determining the future legacy use post 
Olympic Games.  While the market will dictate what the highest and best use for the site is, that use 
may not be able to be efficiently transformed from the Olympic use.  For the proposed Chicago Village, 
a residential legacy use still seems to be a good fit for the project, but exactly what type of residential is 
an important question.  Many buildings are coming online now in the South Loop area, which is less 
than a mile from the proposed site, and are delivering a quantity of units almost the size of Olympic 
Village itself.  The ability for the market to continue to desire these types of units as well as the rate at 
which these units will be absorbed is uncertain. 
 
The fact that the proposed site is in a “new” underdeveloped area of Chicago also can drastically affect 
the market response for uses following the Games.  Value of the project can be significantly affected 
based on the surrounding neighborhoods (i.e. what happens with the adjacent rail yards and 
McCormick Place truck parking areas).  Many of these issues are ones out of the developer’s control, 
but should be considered when valuing the project. 
 
Also, since the typical Olympic program develops around a central “Olympic Ring” which links the 
various venues, attractions and amenities for athletes, visitors and spectators, the buildings constructed 
in the Ring become a landmark of the City.  The urban planning, redesigning and integration into the 
City therefore are determined by the post-Olympic use.  This often makes it difficult for larger Cities to 
host the Games as it involves a very detailed, large-scale plan of the City forecasted far out into the 
future (Synadinos, 2002). 
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4.1.9 Lack of Diversified (Naturally Created) Community 
Finally, the lack of a natural developed community could prove detrimental to the market response to 
the project following the games.  As the IOC requirements would rather see all units and buildings to 
be “exactly” the same, as to ensure that all participants in the Games have access to equal facilities, the 
reality of this type of design leads to a more institutional look and feel, as opposed to a community that 
has been naturally developed over time.  This may be why these uses have worked well in the past to 
create a similar look and feel across a campus setting with institutional users such as in Atlanta and Salt 
Lake City, but the legacy use requirements are very different for the Chicago site. 
 
As discussed as part of the security challenges, the Olympic Village by nature is very compact design 
and of different scale than the immediately surrounding areas.  The ability to locate various 
neighborhood amenities such as bars, restaurants, grocery stores and convenience retail throughout the 
community is crucial. 
 
As part of the Olympic development use, the transportation network is also supplemented during the 
Games.  Athletes and other residents of the Village are provided with temporary transportation during 
the Olympics to provide easy access to other venues and around the City, but this temporary 
transportation goes away after the Games.  While the Chicago site is fairly closely located to existing 
transportation nodes with the Metra Rail (South Shore Line) and the CTA “L” and bus systems, the 
entrances and access points between these transportation hubs and the Village may be very different 
during and after the Games. 
4.2 Opportunities for Design Flexibility/Real Options 
The construction process is essentially irreversible because as buildings are constructed, it usually is not 
cost effective to demolish the building to then build again (Geltner et al, 2007).  It should be noted 
though that many large scale sporting events do consider temporary structures as part of the solution to 
providing shelter and competition space for short duration.  PGA golf tournaments and the Super 
Bowl often use tent structures to house and entertain guest during the events.  Chicago 2016 is also 
proposing the use of a temporary structure for its Olympic Stadium.  To effectively make this decision, 
the cost of the temporary structures should be compared to the proposed cost and returns of a 
permanent development that includes design flexibility.  Other issues and decision points such as 
land/resource availability and political agendas may then cause particular decisions to be made, 
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however these issues are beyond the scope of this study and will not be considered in determining 
optimal development strategies for the proposed venues of this study. 
 
The idea of creating flexibility and a conversion plan to a legacy use, such as transforming Olympic 
housing to market housing, does not require that the final end use of the venue is completely known.  
The planning for the Olympic Games takes many, many years, and because of this, market conditions 
and the desires of the private market proposed to occupy these venues following the Olympics can 
change.  This planning time is not necessarily significantly different from that of other large scale 
development projects, however one key difference does exist.  The Olympic organizers, specifically the 
IOC, have very strict requirements for what must be delivered as part of the Olympic package and 
there is a very strict timeline by which the infrastructure and venues must be delivered.  And while the 
Olympic requirements remain static, the market conditions could be changing drastically.   
 
Here lies the opportunity to potentially create additional value in these venues by identifying 
opportunities for design flexibility.  This design flexibility should be considered a real option that will 
allow the developer the option, or the right, to switch or modify a particular venue use, but not the 
obligation to make this switch.  This right directly relates to the definition of an option in finance 
where it is “the right without obligation to obtain something of value upon the payment or giving up of 
something else of value” (Geltner et al, 2007).  The real option cost ends up being additional 
construction, design and development cost, however if designed and planned properly should create 
additional value. 
4.2.1 Types of Design Flexibility 
Per the research conducted by Keymer (2000), there are essentially three commonly used types of 
design flexibility: 
1. modularizing major components of a building 
2. over-engineering a structure to accommodate additional load capacity 
3. separation of systems 
Keymer also discusses 37 distinct design strategies to pursuing building flexibility that are then 
categorized as Structure, Enclosure, Services and Finish.  The value for each of these strategies is 
discussed and contrary to popular belief, the strategies for implementing flexibility are not always 
expensive.  In fact, increases in the initial construction cost for each of these strategies varied widely.  
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Most strategies created an increase in construction cost of less than 3% and over half of the strategies 
created an increase of less than 1% (Keymer, 2000).  
 
While many of these design flexibility types and strategies are currently being reviewed for the Chicago 
Olympic Village, the process is too early to adequately justify use of any particular strategy at this time.  
All strategies are not necessarily applicable to an Olympic Village Development and would need to be 
further investigated by the architect as the process progresses.  
4.3 Types of Applicable Real Options 
Real options both “on” and “in” the project are applicable to this type of project.  Referencing the 
taxonomy of Trigeorgis as discussed in Chapter 2 and based on the challenges that exist in Olympic 
Venue development projects, the following types of real options are identified as potential sources of 
flexibility for this type of project. 
4.3.1 Option to Switch 
The “switch” option provides the developer the right, but not the obligation, to change uses of a 
project when transforming the development to its legacy use.  As discussed as one of the main 
challenges of a project like this, the legacy use of the development is unknown due to a variety of 
factors, while the Olympic use has very specific delivery requirements.  By designing for convertibility 
to two or more potential uses, it creates the option for the developer to choose the final use at the time 
of transforming the project.  An example of this conversion could be athlete residential units 
transforming to rental, condo, mixed income, senior housing, student housing, or hotel.  Another 
example may be to build Olympic storage and office facilities to be able to accommodate parking 
structures following the Games.  As parking is not required during the Olympics, this could be an 
efficient transition to meet the needs during and after the Games.   
 
By designing for convertibility, such as pre-installing MEP systems for more than one future use, 
splitting systems to accommodate various configurations, or overbuilding structures to accommodate 
different loads in the future, this option is implemented through that design flexibility.  The market will 
dictate what the highest and best use of the site is at that time and the decision maker can then exercise 
the option accordingly. 
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4.3.2 Growth Options 
Growth Options for the Chicago Olympic Village project are based on the ability for the developer to 
build additional buildings for expansion of the project at a later date.  The timing for exercising this 
option is extremely uncertain as it is directly affected by the market response to absorb the base 
Olympic project.  The option to abandon the temporary structures built for the Olympic Games (while 
expected, but not required) creates the growth option by opening up vacant, developable land.  This 
growth option also allows the developer to wait to build new product only and when the new buildings 
can benefit from the value created by the initial Olympic Village development. 
4.3.3 Option to Abandon 
The option to abandon the project post-Olympic games is an extremely unlikely event, however does 
exist.  However, this option is presented in multiple forms and is a very probable result for the 
temporary facilities that will be constructed for the village.  As mentioned briefly in the growth option 
discussion, by exercising the option to abandon these temporary facilities, as a result the subsequent 
growth option is created.  Unlike the option to switch, this option is considered “on” the project as it is 
less concerned with design features built into the project.  
4.3.4 Option to Defer 
The option to defer and wait a period of time before resuming operation is sometimes otherwise 
known as a type of phasing option and is yet another example of a real option “on” a project.  This 
type of deferral option does differ from the time-to-build or staged investment option where the latter 
option category is an option “in” a project and therefore requires more detailed design and engineering 
flexibility to accommodate that staging approach to completing a project.  For example, if a developer 
were to only complete a part of a single building, expecting that the remainder of the project would be 
completed at a later date, this would be a case of the staged investment option.  As another example 
though, if one building was constructed of a master plan with expectation that other building may be 
built when the market can accommodate it, this would be a case of the option to defer as it does not 
require design flexibility built into the project itself. 
 
The application of the defer option stems from the extreme uncertainty in the market response to a 
project of this type and size.  Absorption rate of units can be assumed, but these assumptions can vary 
widely.  By considering the option to defer a project, or part of a project, capital for that project is only 
deployed as necessary and the duration between the costs and revenues is decreased.  This option along 
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with the option to switch are determined to be key components of achieving financial success for a 
project of this type and will be evaluated an analyzed further as part of the Real Options Analysis 
section in the next chapter. 
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5.0 Real Options Analysis of the Proposed Chicago 2016 Olympic Village 
 
It should be noted that this is an analysis of a hypothetical case study based on the present knowledge of and available 
information for the Proposed Chicago 2016 Olympic Village. Some figures are assumed based on market knowledge or 
other public information.  The purposed of the thesis and this analysis is to present a concrete example of the framework to 
analyze real option opportunities in Olympic venues.   
 
Traditional analyses such as discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis have their shortcomings and 
specifically seem to neglect to value flexibility in a project.  Instead, they assume potential future cash 
flows are “known”, static and unable to be changed.  For a scenario where these attributes are true, 
then analysis using DCF or similar analysis will be sufficient, but most projects in real estate 
development are not as such (Mun, 2006). 
 
As discussed earlier, the creation of a real option should always create additional value.  Again, this is 
assuming that the option can and is exercised at an optimal time.  The net change in value, however 
can only be determined after identifying the cost of the option and then quantifying the additional 
value created as a result of the option. 
 
Net Change in Value = Additional Value Created – Option Cost 
 
Considering the number of unknown conditions and therefore the significant uncertainty involved in 
an Olympic Village development, the process of applying flexibility and real options analysis may be 
able to overcome the typical post-Olympic hang over that many venues feel.  ROA can be used as a 
tool to further analyze these areas of uncertainty, value the flexibility that is applied and help managers 
and key decision makers decide the most efficient course of action for their project. 
 
As defined by Mun, the eight critical steps to performing a real options analysis are as follows (Mun, 
2006): 
1. Risk Identification – Qualitative Management Screening 
2. Risk Prediction – Time-Series and Regression Forecasting 
3. Risk Modeling – Base Case DCF Analysis 
4. Risk Analysis – Monte Carlo Simulation 
5. Risk Mitigation – Real Options Problem Framing 
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6. Risk Hedging – Real Options Modeling and Analysis 
7. Risk Diversification – Portfolio and Resource Optimization 
8. Risk Management – Reporting and Update Analysis 
 
Each of these steps are reviewed in detail, and for those steps that directly apply to the proposed 
Chicago 2016 Olympic Village case study, the analysis and findings are discussed. 
 
Understanding the explicit steps involved in ROA should help explain how the process is developed 
from traditional analyses (either DCF or NPV).  Real estate financial analysis by many practitioners 
traditionally finishes after step 3 or occasionally step 4.  The remaining steps 5-8 provide the detailed 
process for how users of this process can understand the full concept and power of ROA and how it 
can be applied in even more detail to further analyze a project and fully realize the benefits of the entire 
process. 
 
The following steps should be considered a framework for analyzing projects with uncertainty where 
ROA should benefit the user to better determine the real value of a project with built in design 
flexibility and the ability to exercise that option at the optimal time.  As almost all of the data specific to 
the proposed Chicago 2016 Olympic Village has either not been created yet, or is still confidential 
information, it is suggested that this process is completed when the actual proposal is being created for 
this proposed project after which a host city is selected.  This model and process is also created with 
the ability to adapt to other host cities plans for their Olympic Village as well as other large scale, short 
term uses or Hallmark events (Syme et al, 1989). 
5.1 Risk Identification – Qualitative Management Screening 
During this step, the objective is to review various projects and or strategies that are viable for further 
analysis.  In the case of the Chicago Olympic Village, looking at various projects or initiatives is not 
necessarily applicable, so the analysis instead targets various strategies for this particular project.  These 
strategies start to be created by identifying the major challenges, risks and areas of uncertainty involved 
in the project.  Any solutions to these issues, however, must meet the overall goals of the project while 
being inline with the firm’s agenda as a whole. 
 
For this particular project, many of these challenges and areas of uncertainty are a result of the project 
being an Olympic venue development, instead of a more typical real estate development.  The 
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differences between these two types of projects were identified in Chapter 4.  These differences, by no 
means, represent all of the risks involved in this project, because virtually any developer is going to 
understand the many other risks involved with development.  This risk evaluation leads to an overall 
assessment by the developer to determine how the project should be approached and quantifies what 
level of return is required to compensate for the incurred risk. 
5.2 Risk Prediction – Time-Series and Regression Forecasting 
The goal of this step in the process is to forecast certain variables for the valuation of this project.  
These variables will range from projected rents, construction costs, operating costs and financing terms.  
Forecasting values for these variables can be completed through 3rd party research firms such as Torto 
Wheaton Research or Real Capital Analytics, by consulting market experts, or through regression of 
historical data to determine trends in the change of value for the variables. 
 
As noted before, the purpose of this thesis is not to complete a full feasibility study for the proposed 
Olympic Village.  As a result, data for the analysis was collected from public sources and other market 
experts.  Values are trended based on historical trends, or inflation, to determine assumed values for a 
2016 analysis.  The following table indicates assumptions used for this analysis: 
 
Table 5.1 – Development Budget for Deterministic Model 
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Table 5.2 – Projected Revenues for Deterministic Model 
 
Projected revenues were trended using an expected growth rate to determine each of these values in 
2016 dollars.  These assumptions were verified by market professionals for the Chicago market and 
were applied in the next step to conduct the Base Case DCF analysis. 
5.3 Risk Modeling – Base Case DCF Analysis 
The next step in the ROA process is to create a base case scenario using more traditional methods such 
as net present value (NPV) calculation or discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis.  As a part of that 
analysis, anticipated cash flows throughout the project need to be discounted at an appropriate risk-
adjusted rate.  For this particular analysis, the following assumptions were made: 
 
Table 5.3 – Assumptions for Projected Cash Flows 
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Table 5.4 – Assumptions for Project Analysis 
 
 
Running a full DCF analysis, which can be viewed in Appendix B-Exhibit 5, the following results are 
calculated for a condominium project, an apartment project and combined 50% condominium and 
50% apartment project (50%/50% allocation was selected arbitrarily based on the knowledge that the 
project would need to have some combination of the two asset types): 
 
Table 5.5 – Calculated IRR for Various Deterministic Projects (Condo, Apt and 50/50 Combined) 
 
A few assumptions were made regarding this DCF that may be slightly different from ordinary real 
estate valuation methods.  First, no additional costs (i.e. sales commissions, leasing commissions, 
operating expenses or capital reserves) were added (or subtracted) in the model and all values, as noted 
in Table 5.3, were assumed to be included in the expected revenues for each asset type.  Second, the 
consideration of apartment revenue was calculated by dividing the Net Operating Income (NOI) for 
the apartment unit (on a yearly basis) by the assumed capitalization rate.  This apartment value was fully 
realized in a single year, based on absorption rate, as if the unit (or at least its underlying cash flows) 
was sold.  This method was used to correlate to the method used in the simulation that will be 
observed in the next step (5.4).  
 
Casually reviewing these results, one may choose that the condominium project is a better project and 
therefore should be selected over the apartment or combined projects as it is providing the highest 
return (IRR) for both the development phase and overall project.  Due to uncertainty in the expected 
sales revenues, however, this is not necessarily the best choice.  Further analysis by real estate 
professionals is sometimes necessary through the use of Monte Carlo Simulation that helps factor in 
the uncertainty of particular variable inputs.  This simulation runs multiple iterations of the same model 
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using a specified potential range of values for the uncertain assumptions made in the static case.  A 
range of results is then obtained. 
5.4 Risk Analysis – Monte Carlo Simulation 
As the static, base case DCF analysis produces only a single result, the only thing that is truly known is 
that the deterministic outcome of that analysis is either high or low.  Based on the number of forecasts 
and assumptions placed into the calculation, there is little confidence that the result will be 100% 
accurate.  Monte Carlo simulation, therefore, is used to evaluate a range of possible values for a specific 
input to determine its effect on the resulting value of a project.  This resulting value is then often 
graphically represented in a Tornado chart, histogram or VARG curve (Hassan et al, 2005) to display 
the range of outcomes for that analysis.  Even in the absence of flexibility, Monte Carlo simulation 
should provide a more accurate representation of the potential value of a project. 
 
The goal of running a Monte Carlo simulation is to more accurately model uncertainty in a project.  
Monte Carlo simulation may not currently be an extremely widely used method for valuing real estate 
projects due to lack of client understanding, negative connotation with “gambling” and limitations as 
noted below (Foster and Lee, 2009), but it does provide a good method for evaluating uncertain 
assumptions.  Another choice for modeling uncertainty is scenario analysis (optimistic, base, and 
pessimistic scenarios), however this method is not as robust as Monte Carlo simulation.  
 
Monte Carlo Simulation effectively runs a large number of iterations of the traditional DCF (or NPV) 
analysis, but allows each iteration to randomly choose modifiable variables.  This is different from 
traditional discounted cash flow analysis where these unknown variables are typically averaged over an 
expected period of time and used in their static form.  The proposed use and size of a project is also 
static and unchanged in DCF. 
 
The Monte Carlo Simulation for this ROA uses 2000 iterations where each iteration evaluates the 
proposed NPV for each of the possible legacy uses following the 2016 Olympic residential athlete use.  
All variables up to that point that are deemed “certain” (including hard and soft construction costs) are 
considered static for sake of example.  Other variables though are considered “uncertain” and 
randomly generated for each iteration.  In this model, absorption rate and expected sales price for both 
condominiums and apartments are uncertain.  Other assumptions and uncertainty levels for this 
stochastic model are as presented in Table 5.6: 
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Table 5.6 – Baseline Assumptions used for all simulations in analysis unless otherwise noted 
 
 
The results for this model are presented as VARG (Value at Risk Gain) Curves and histograms that 
represent the cumulative probability distribution of the project’s outcome.  In other words, the 
probability of a specific NPV being realized for the project is observed.  The resulting VARG curve 
and histograms are displayed below for both the condominium and apartment project alternatives: 
5.4.1 Stochastic Model Results – Without any Uncertainty 
As mentioned in section 5.3, the simulation model has been calibrated to correlate with the static DCF 
analysis and uses the project IRR generated from that model to use for the simulation model.  As the 
allocation of condominiums and apartments was arbitrarily decided to be 50% each, the combined 
project IRR observed in Table 5.5 is used for further simulation in this ROA.  The calibration of the 
model can still be verified by setting the condominium/apartment allocations to either 100%/0% or 
0%/100% and observing the NPV of the project in the simulation to be $0 for a particular asset when 
its allocation is set to 100%.  These calibration verifications can be seen below (Note: Set all 
uncertainty and weight factors to zero in Exhibit 6 and set Option to Defer to “OFF”.  OCC Project 
Level should also be set to “Project IRR”): 
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Figure 5.1 – Calibration Verification VARG curve – 100% condominiums 
 
Table 5.7 – eNPV Results for Calibration Verification – 100% condominiums 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 – Calibration Verification VARG curve – 100% apartments 
 
Table 5.8 – eNPV Results for Calibration Verification – 100% apartments 
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Figure 5.3 – Calibration Verification VARG curve – 50% condominiums / 50% apartments 
 
Table 5.9 – eNPV Results for Calibration Verification – 50% condominiums / 50% apartments 
 
5.4.2 Stochastic Model Results – Introduction of Sales Revenue Uncertainty 
The next step in the stochastic analysis is to introduce uncertainty in the sales revenues for both 
condominiums and apartments.  The ranges of uncertainties are noted in the base assumption in Table 
5.6.  Results in the form of a VARG curve, histogram and table of values of the Monte Carlo 
simulation for each project alternative are as follows: 
 
Figure 5.4 – Condominium Project with Sales Revenue Uncertainty – VARG curve and results 
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Figure 5.5 – Condominium Project with Sales Revenue Uncertainty – Histogram 
 
 
Figure 5.6 – Apartment Project with Sales Revenue Uncertainty – VARG curve and results 
 
 
Figure 5.7 – Condominium Project with Sales Revenue Uncertainty – Histogram 
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5.4.3 Comparison of Stochastic Model Results for Various Alternative Projects 
A few key observations of these alternative project results should be based on the stochastic model 
results and specifically the expected NPVs for either a condominium development or an apartment 
development.  Results are shown below in Figure 5.8: 
 
 
Figure 5.8 – Alternative Projects (Condo or Apt) with Sales Revenue Uncertainty – VARG curve and results 
 
A casual observer, and someone that is not familiar with Real Options Analysis, may come to an early 
conclusion that the proposed condominium development is a more financially advantageous project 
because it has a higher expected NPV.  This reasoning has been used for years as part of a DCF 
analysis or following the NPV rule.  Using the next three steps of the ROA, this reasoning is 
investigated and challenged. 
5.5 Risk Mitigation – Real Options Framing 
The differences between this project and other real estate projects, as discussed in Chapter 4, provide 
an excellent opportunity to show how ROA can help mitigate the effects of the challenges presented by 
these differences. 
 
All risks do not have the same magnitude of an effect on project returns, or in other words, do not 
have the same risk profile.  The next part of this step in the process is to rank each of these areas of 
uncertainty to determine which should be further analyzed.  If time was not an issue, all points of 
uncertainty could be integrated into the simulation, but this would be an extremely complicated task for 
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this study.  Based on discussions with interested developers of the site (Dickson, 2009; Harder, 2009; 
Loewenberg, 2009), challenges and sources of uncertainty were identified and subsequently coded to 
acknowledge general themes among the responses.  As a result, the following list and rank of the top 
five concerns was determined5: 
1. Unknown future legacy use 
2. Scale of the project 
3. Timing of the project 
4. Venue Requirements 
5. Schedule and Guarantees 
 
The practical next step is to further review this list of areas of uncertainty to choose the one or two 
variables that will be addressed with the concepts of design flexibility and modeled in the simulation 
analysis for the project.  For this hypothetical project, the four main options previously discussed were 
the options to switch, grow, abandon and phase.  All of these options would have the opportunity to 
be exercised following the Olympic Games.  The options chosen to model in this analysis will be 
identified in the next section. 
5.6 Risk Hedging – Real Options Modeling 
As discussed earlier, the ideas of flexibility or real options provide an opportunity for management of a 
project to modify their previous decisions.  Specifically, managers have the ability to change what, how 
much and when of a product will be delivered to market.  The few types of options discussed in 
Chapter 6 (Switch, Expand, Abandon and Defer) could be integrated into the model and then 
simulated.  The ROA for this project, however, only analyzes the Option to Switch and Option to 
Defer for simplicity.  Using the previous step of Real Options Framing, it appeared that the legacy use 
for the venue was the most uncertain and important issue of the project.  Delivery of a large number of 
units into the market at the same time was also a critical issue. 
 
Through the use of Monte Carlo simulation as reviewed in step 4, the implied volatility of forecasted 
values such as expected condominium sales price and expected apartment sales price will result in a 
range of anticipated value for the project under either of the proposed development scenarios.  
However, as a result of the uncertainty in forecasted sales prices, there may be times when apartments 
                                                 
5 This list was created based on qualitative interpretation of interested developers for the Chicago 2016 Olympic 
Village site.  No specific ranking or survey data was requested from the interview participants. 
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are more valuable and there may be times when condominiums are more valuable.  Here is the perfect 
opportunity to apply the “switch” real option, as identified in step 5, to the analysis model.  By using 
the inputs of uncertainty factors, weighting factors and expected base sales prices, the real options 
modeling can obtain the project’s “strategic option value”. 
5.6.1 Limitations of Analysis Model 
While the benefits of ROA and Monte Carlo simulation are strong, limitation still exist for the method 
that must be evaluated as part of the results of the model.  These limitations and consequences are as 
follows: 
1. Due to correlation factors that are typical of trends in market pricing (differences between 
systematic and non-systematic changes), the model currently can only accommodate two 
choices in the flexible design (i.e. apartments vs. condos, or student housing vs. senior housing).  
There is correlation built into the model, identified as the Weight Factor, which partially 
models the systematic change in market conditions.  As the integration with correlation of a 
third, or more, choice(s) in the model would be very complicated, if has not been considered as 
part of the scope of this study. 
2. Each option must have similar returns in order for flexibility to have any value (i.e. if condos 
always have a higher value [NPV], then flexibility does not add anything to the analysis).  This 
is because there is less uncertainty, if any, if the more valuable alternative is already known 
prior to even running the simulation. 
3. Correlation of real estate projects and asset types is still very difficult to determine.  Data is not 
developed enough to realistically forecast these correlations. (Foster and Lee, 2009) 
4. Selection of an accurate distribution type (normal, uniform, skewed, etc.) is difficult to 
determine.  Varying skewness in a distribution may also dramatically affect the possibility of 
returns (Foster and Lee, 2009). 
5. The requirements to pick a range of potential values for the simulation will still always be 
deleting some extreme (either high or low) values from the possible range for the analysis 
(Foster and Lee, 2009).  For this analysis, the RAND() function in Excel automatically uses 
uniform distribution.   
5.6.2 “Pedagogical” Model vs. “Applied” Model 
Two models are used as part of the simulation for this ROA.  The first, which shall be referred to as 
the “pedagogical” model, was presented in an MIT Real Estate Finance course (11.431) by Geltner and 
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Cardin (2009) to conceptually portray the ideas of real option valuation.  The second model, which 
shall be referred to as the “applied” model, was created specifically for this analysis and integrates many 
of the requirements and conditions of the proposed Chicago Olympic Village project. 
5.6.2.1 Mechanics of the “Pedagogical” Model 
The “pedagogical” model evaluates the option to switch uses between condominiums and apartments 
at each of 3 phases in a project.  An example NPV calculation worksheet from the “pedagogical” 
model can be viewed in Appendix B.  At each phase, the Net Present Value (NPV) is calculated for 
both alternatives of only condominiums and only apartments using the following equations: 
 
Sales Revenue – Construction and Sales Costs = Net Cash Flow    (1) 
Present Value of Net Cash Flow = Net Cash Flow / (1 + discount rate)^number of years (2) 
NPV = PV Phase 1 Cash Flow + PV Phase 2 Cash Flow + PV Phase 3 Cash Flow (3) 
 
The NPV for each type of development (condominium vs. apartment) is compared, and the highest 
NPV is selected as part of the Flexible development.  This entire iteration is then repeated 2000 times 
in a Monte Carlo simulation.  At each iteration, a random value between 0 and 1 is generated twice 
which are then used to calculate the randomly generated increase or decrease to the base line expected 
sales revenue per unit for both condominiums and apartments.  This calculation for condominium 
Expected Sales Price is as follows: 
 
Condo Expected Sales Price = Baseline Sales Price * (1 + Uncertainty Factor * (RAND + RAND – 1))       
(4) 
 
The calculation for apartments is slightly different as it includes a component to apply a correlation 
factor between the change to condominiums and the change to apartments.  This is intended to mimic 
actual changes in realized sales prices as favorable or unfavorable market conditions will generally 
affect both asset types in a similar fashion, although not exactly proportional.  As a result, the following 
equation calculates the change in apartment sales price as a percentage, or weight factor, of the change 
in condo sales price for that phase, and the remaining percentage as a randomly generated increase or 
decrease to the apartment baseline sales price: 
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((Weight Factor * % Δ of Condo Price + (1 - Weight Factor)*(RAND + RAND - 1)) * Uncertainty Factor + 1) 
* Apt Expected Sales Price  (5) 
 
The use of the Weight Factor in this equation is similar to correlation in finance theory, but lower.  The 
effect, however, results in the standard deviations of projected NPV for apartments to be lower than 
normal ranges since part of the change of expected NPV for apartment development is directly related 
to the change in expected condominium sales revenues. 
 
This “pedagogical” model makes many assumptions to make the model easier to understand, however 
these assumptions may or may not mimic those of real project.  Specifically all revenues and costs to 
develop a project are assumed to occur in the same year.  Also, the only opportunity to modify phasing 
is by changing the number of years per phase, but this modification is not triggered by a change to 
expected absorption or lease up of a project.   
 
Example results of this effect are as follows: 
Table 5.10 – Table of Option Values from “pedagogical” model6 
# of 
years 
/phase 
Mean Condo Only 
NPV 
Mean Apt Only 
NPV 
Mean Flexible 
NPV 
Imputed Value of 
Option 
Option Value % 
of Highest Mean 
NPV 
0.5 925,553,874 875,968,804 967,241,700 41,687,827 4.50% 
1 775,497,604 733,295,749 803,663,185 28,165,580 3.63% 
1.5 646,372,760 613,721,151 664,051,491 17,678,732 2.74% 
2 546,853,563 518,299,607 557,586,100 10,732,537 1.96% 
2.5 467,830,589 442,035,764 470,941,850 3,111,261 0.67% 
3 397,647,545 379,234,855 396,948,498 -699,048 -0.18% 
3.5 343,160,468 324,028,366 334,510,347 -8,650,121 -2.52% 
4 296,870,078 280,589,443 285,335,013 -11,535,065 -3.89% 
 
Table 5.10 above shows how the overall imputed value of the option dramatically decreases as the 
number of years per phase increases.  This option value is critical in determining whether it is 
advantageous to use flexibility in a project.  This value, subtracting the cost of the option, provides the 
net value created by the option.  Using Table 5.9 as an example, as the benefits of the option are 
extended further out in time, and therefore increasing the duration between the time at which to 
purchase the option and the opportunity to exercise the option, the net value of the option decreases.  
This result may be counter intuitive to most real options analysis results as options typically increase in 
                                                 
6 As the Monte Carlo simulation randomly generates variables, this table would not be recreated exactly if regenerated 
using the “simple” model. 
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value as the time to exercise them increases, however these results are observed because as you expend 
capital to purchase the option early on, you have to wait longer and longer to exercise the option and 
reap the benefits of it.  In essence, there is less flexibility because there are fewer opportunities where 
you can change your decision. 
 
A few of these assumptions of the “pedagogical” model are addressed in the “applied” model to create 
a more realistic model for the Chicago 2016 Olympic Village case study. 
5.6.2.2 Mechanics of the “Applied” Model 
The main goal of the “applied” model is to utilize the Excel technology that most developers and real 
estate professionals are familiar with along with the system already developed in the “pedagogical” 
model to create a more realistic valuation of the proposed Chicago Olympic Village project.  Sample 
worksheets from the “applied” model can be viewed in Appendix C.  As noted earlier, the actual data 
regarding this project is extremely sparse as it is either confidential in nature or not yet developed.  
Assumptions made in the static DCF model will still be the same for the analysis using the “applied” 
model, but the “applied” model is programmed to accept changes to any assumed value.  These values 
are identified as blue text in the model and bold text in the printed worksheets. 
 
Major differences in the “applied” model are as follows: 
1. Five additional tabs are added to assist with creating the static model which then feed into the 
inputs for the Monte Carlo Simulation.  These tabs (Development Budget, Projected Revenues, 
Construction Schedule, Projected Cash Flows, and Project Analysis) [exhibits 1-5] are sheets 
that are used in Step 3 for Risk Modeling – Base Case DCF Analysis.   
2. Models two forms of real options: Option to Switch – flexibility in the ability to deliver 
condominiums or apartments to the public market; and Option to Defer – flexibility to phase a 
project and vary the duration of the phases depending on the absorption rate for that phase. 
3. Ability to modify the project level discount rate for the entire project. 
4. Correlation between change in expected sales revenues and absorption rate is integrated.  A 
Weight Factor is again used that determines the percentage of change of the absorption rate 
that is directly proportional to the change in condo sales revenue. 
5. Sales of phase “n” units will not begin selling until phase “n”-1 units are completely sold out.  
Sales rates are determined by the absorption rate, which is assumed to be the same for both 
condominiums and apartments. 
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6. Correlation between expected sales price of condominiums and apartments was modified 
slightly to reduce the effect that expected apartment prices converge on the expected 
condominium prices as the Weight Factor is increased.  Instead the percentage change in 
expected price, with respect to the Uncertainty Factor, should converge as Weight Factor is 
increased. 
5.7 Risk Diversification – Portfolio and Resource Optimization 
Portfolio optimization is an optional step in the process and would only be conducted if there were 
multiple projects to analyze and select.  If there were other projects to choose from, then portfolio 
optimization is very important and there may be opportunity to hedge and diversify risk through a 
portfolio of projects or assets.  This step would also provide optimal allocation of capital across the 
portfolio of projects.  Considering only one project is being evaluated for this analysis, and there are no 
other opportunities to select alternative projects, this step will not be evaluated for this analysis.  
5.8 Risk Management – Reporting and Update Analysis 
The real options analysis framework concludes with the presentation of the results in report or 
graphical form.  These results should allow decision makers for a project to choose the most desired 
path based on the goals and requirements of the project, along with the characteristics of the investor 
(i.e. desire to take on higher risk to obtain a higher return).  The template or framework created as part 
of the ROA should also allow the analyst to continue to iteratively run the analysis as the projects 
progresses through the development process and input data becomes more and more certain. 
 
Overall, the analysis for this project performed mostly as hypothesized and the results from the 
“applied” model were very interesting.  The base case, where neither the option to switch nor the 
option to defer were applied, was presented in Step 4 of the ROA process as results of the stochastic 
model for the two alternative projects (condominium and apartment).  These base case results are 
compared to the application of the various alternative options “on” and “in” the project in the 
remaining results of this analysis that are split into the following scenarios: 
‐ Without Option to Defer and With Option to Switch 
‐ With Option to Defer and Without Option to Switch 
‐ With Option to Defer and With Option to Switch 
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A summary of results for each of these scenarios is as follows: 
Table 5.11 – Compiled mean eNPV results of various option strategies for ROA 
 Without Option to Switch With Option to 
Switch 
 Condo Apt Flexible 
Without Option to Defer 11,229,497 -22,362,900 48,782,747 
With Option to Defer 20,800,835 -10,664,558 58,579,656 
 
Table 5.12 – Compiled max eNPV results of various option strategies for ROA 
 Without Option to Switch With Option to 
Switch 
 Condo Apt Flexible 
Without Option to Defer 268,623,573 17,028,826 268,623,573 
With Option to Defer 262,359,475 35,575,509 262,359,475 
 
Table 5.13 – Compiled min eNPV results of various option strategies for ROA 
 Without Option to Switch With Option to 
Switch 
 Condo Apt Flexible 
Without Option to Defer -239,443,322 -70,131,886 -62,037,411 
With Option to Defer -237,440,288 -64,207,297 -64,207,297 
 
For each new scenario involving various types of applied options, the VARG graph and tabular results, 
including the expected mean, max, min and standard deviation, are presented along with the 
assumptions made for that particular scenario.  This “multi-criteria” table is presented as different 
decision makers will have different criterion for which they will apply the results (i.e. some may choose 
to minimize losses by selecting the alternative with the highest min value, or another may be interested 
in selecting the alternative with the highest mean). 
5.8.1 Without Option to Defer and With Option to Switch 
After combining the results of the stochastic model in Step 4 for each alternative project, the flexible 
scenario is added to the VARG curve to observe the added value with the integration of this option.  
Here the additional value created by the flexible option can be calculated by subtracting the mean NPV 
value for either the condominium or apartment development from the flexible development.  Under 
this set of assumptions, approximately $22 million in value is created.  It should be noted though that 
the cost of the option has yet to be included to determine the overall value creation with flexibility. 
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Figure 5.9 – Flexible Project without Option to Defer or Absorption Uncertainty – VARG curve 
 
Table 5.14 – Flexible Project without Option to Defer or Absorption Uncertainty – eNPV Results 
 
 
When applying absorption uncertainty to the model, the follow summary of results is observed: 
 
Table 5.15 – Flexible Project without Option to Defer and with Absorption Uncertainty – eNPV Results 
 
 
Comparing the results in Table 5.13 with the results in Table 5.14 to determine the effect absorption 
uncertainty has on the eNPVs for the project, one can see that there is a decrease in values for most 
criteria.  The next scenario will analyze the effect of integrating the Option to Defer into the model. 
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5.8.2 With Option to Defer and Without Option to Switch 
 
Figure 5.10 –Condominium and Apartment Projects with Option to Defer – VARG Curve and tabular results 
 
Comparing this scenario results to those results of the condominium and apartment alternatives 
without the Option to Defer illustrates approximately the same increase in mean eNPV value for both 
alternatives.  More details on this interesting result will be mentioned in the next scenario analysis.  
Resulting changes in the maximum and minimum eNPV values are also observed with the introduction 
of the Option to Defer, however these changes in value are not as significant as those of the mean 
eNPV values. 
 
There are some limitations to the Option to Defer scenario that were implemented into the model for 
simplicity.  These assumptions include: 
‐ the maximum number of phases for the project is three, based on the structural ability of 
the model 
‐ the number of years per phase will be constant for the project, but will fluctuate based on 
the time (rounded to the nearest year) it takes to obtain the desired occupancy hurdle rate 
for the condominium absorption for Phase 1 only – further development of these 
assumptions should be made in further expansion of the model 
‐ for all phases, sales or “leases” for the next phase supply will not be sold until all units are 
sold out for the previous phase  
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5.8.3 With Option to Defer and With Option to Switch 
For the last scenario, uncertainty is applied for both sales price and absorption, and both the Option to 
Defer and Option to Switch are evaluated.  The results are as follows: 
 
 
Figure 5.11 –Condominium, Apartment and Flexible Projects with Option to Defer – VARG Curve 
 
Table 5.16 – Phased Condominium and Apartment Projects – eNPV Results 
 
 
Table 5.17 – Replicated Table 5.14 without Option to Defer to compare with Table 5.15 – eNPV Results 
 
 
Table 5.18 – Changes in values between Table 5.15 and Table 5.16  – eNPV Results 
  Condo Only Apt Only Flexible 
Mean  $        9,571,338  $      11,698,342  $        9,796,909  
Max  $      -6,264,098  $      18,546,683  $      -6,264,098  
Min  $        2,003,034  $        5,924,589  $      -2,169,886  
STD  $      -1,505,617  $         -265,685  $      -1,396,543  
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The introduction of the Option to Defer simultaneously with the Option to Switch provides yet even 
higher results for all criteria of the project.  It is also interesting to observe that the actual change in the 
mean eNPV, with the integration of the Option to Defer, is approximately the same for the flexible 
alternative as it is for the condominium and apartment alternatives.  This would illustrate that the value 
created from the Option to Defer is cumulative to the value created from the Option to Switch. 
5.8.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
A final step in a the analysis process is to review sensitivity results, or now a certain return metric (in 
this case mean NPV) changes as another input variable changes.  This step can help a decision maker 
understand the potential for predicted outcomes to change as a factor of the various sensitivity inputs. 
5.8.4.1 Change in Flexibility Weight Factor 
 
Figure 5.12 – Sensitivity Analysis – mean eNPV as a function of Flexibility Weight Factor 
 
As observed in Figure 5.12, as the Weight Factor increases, the mean eNPV for the flexible alternative 
decreases.  This is probably a result of less uncertainty being observed in the project between the two 
alternatives of pursuing condominium or apartment development.  The value does not completely 
disappear as there is still uncertainty regarding the fluctuation in projected sales prices for both 
alternatives, however, variation in both asset types will move in the same direction and with the same 
relative magnitude.  
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5.8.4.2 Change in Condominium and Apartment Volatilities 
 
Figure 5.13 – Sensitivity Analysis – mean eNPV as a function of Condominium Volatility 
 
 
 
Figure 5.14 – Sensitivity Analysis – mean eNPV as a function of Apartment Volatility 
 
 
Figure 5.15 – Sensitivity Analysis – mean eNPV as a function of Condominium and Apartment Volatility 
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The important take away from this observation is that while each individual alternative does not change 
significantly with the variation in condominium and apartment volatility, the flexible alternative 
increases as each project becomes more volatile, or uncertain.  When comparing the results of the 
individual changes in volatilities for condominium and apartment prices with those when both 
volatilities are changing at the same rate, it is observed that the additional value created for the flexible 
option is not cumulative, but rather only slightly higher, if any higher, in the combined scenario. 
5.8.4.3 Change in Weight Factor for Option to Defer 
 
 
Figure 5.16 – Sensitivity Analysis – mean eNPV as a function of Option to Defer Weight Factor 
 
The change in mean eNPV as a function of the Phasing (Option to Defer) Weight Factor appears to 
show the increase in value the more it correlates with the percentage change of either condominium or 
apartment sale price, respectively.  The changes in value, however, are fairly small illustrating that the 
mean eNPV for the project is not very sensitive to the Phasing (Option to Defer) Weight Factor. 
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5.8.4.4 Change in Absorption Rate Volatility 
This scenario evaluates the effect that change in Absorption Rate Volatility has on the expected NPV 
for the project.  Interestingly, the change in eNPV with each change in volatility percentage is 
approximately the same for all three development options (condominium, apartment or flexible option).  
This is most likely a result of the mean absorption rate settling (or averaging) around the base 
absorption rate when spread out over a large number of simulation iterations. 
 
 
Figure 5.17 – Sensitivity Analysis – mean eNPV as a function of Absorption Volatility with Option to Defer “ON” 
 
 
Figure 5.18 – Sensitivity Analysis – mean eNPV as a function of Absorption Volatility with Option to Defer “OFF” 
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6.0 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
The purpose of this thesis is not to present the “answer” to the many issues related to the proposed 
development of the Chicago 2016 Olympic Village, or of Olympic Venue development in general.  It 
should hopefully provide another tool that can help identify ways to assess the complicated problems 
for this type of project and illustrates the usefulness of ROA. 
 
After completing the analysis and working through the framework of how to value the flexibility in a 
project like this, it is too early in the process to guarantee value creation, however, the potential does 
exist for this additional value to be realized.  Project financial assumptions and calculations at this point 
are educated guesses and “back of the envelope” at best.  This process would continue to be refined as 
the development process progressed through the development stages. 
 
Reviewing the hypothesis for this study, it was confirmed that those interested in the Chicago Olympic 
Village development were interested in the ideas of design flexibility for the project, but were not far 
enough along in the process to start discussing implementation strategies for this flexibility and more 
importantly were concerned with the cost of flexibility and how that would affect the overall returns of 
the project.  Very few developers had implemented design flexibility into their projects previously and 
no one interviewed had heard of or used Real Options Analysis.  All were interested in the topic and 
anxious to learn more about how it could be beneficial to the Chicago Olympic Village or other 
development projects.  It should also be considered that this real options analysis methodology and 
example can be applied to other large-scale, important projects thereby expanding the possibilities 
where this “new” form of analysis can be beneficial.  
 
Comparing the results of the “applied” model with the hypothesis for the study, the model did identify 
additional value in the project, based on the assumptions made for the analysis, however the cost of the 
option for this project was still unknown.  The net value change on the project therefore was not 
calculated.  This value would need to be identified in order to make an educated decision of whether 
flexibility would be an economically advantageous altnerative. 
 
One of the very interesting results of the analysis involved the interaction of the two forms of flexibility 
(Option to Switch and Option to Defer) that were applied to the project simultaneously and modeled.  
The results illustrate that the value created by each of these options was virtually cumulative when 
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applied together.  This could be explained by the fact that one option is “on” the project while the 
other option is “in” the project.  As discussed in the background information on real options, those 
options “on” the project have little interdependency with other options, but the opposite is true for 
those options “in” a project.  As this is only one example of modeling this type of interdependency for 
this project, further research and testing of this phenomenon of cumulative results from various types 
of options would prove very useful for future modeling and analysis of these types of projects. 
 
Further studies should also continue to investigate the challenges and uncertainties of Olympic venue 
development to identify areas where design flexibility can be implemented.  The analysis models, while 
adapted to the requirements of the proposed Chicago 2106 Olympic Village, can continue to be 
developed to improve the representation of actual conditions for the project. 
 
Overall, the information presented in this study should prove useful for those individuals looking to 
address the challenges with Olympic Village development.  At the very least, it is another tool for 
decision makers to use in trying to identify potential sources of flexibility and value for a project. 
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Appendix A – Interview Questions 
 
Venue Background 
1. Please tell me about your position related to the Olympic Games Planning? 
2. Please tell me about the Olympic project you are involved with? 
3. What are the requirements from the IOC for this venue? 
4. How do you plan on using this venue following the Olympic Games? 
5. Has this plan changed during the course of planning? 
6. How well do you feel you are positioned to deliver the best product to the private market 
following the Games? 
7. So far, do you consider this project to be a success?  From the IOC’s point of view?  From 
your point of view?  From the private market’s point of view?  How do you determine success? 
8. What are the characteristics that make Olympic venue development different from typical real 
estate development projects? 
 
Project Uncertainty 
1. What are the major sources of uncertainty you face with this type of project? 
2. How would you usually deal with this type of uncertainty in design and planning? 
3. How does this project differ from that normal process? 
4. How do these uncertainties affect the way you plan for this project? 
 
Design Flexibility 
1. What do you consider to be design flexibility? 
2. What are different types or examples of design flexibility? 
3. Have you consider the use of design flexibility for your project? 
4. If so, can you explain this design flexibility and how it would be implemented? 
5. How would this flexibility help you to meet the needs of the IOC? 
6. How would this flexibility help you to meet the needs of the private markets following the 
Games? 
7. How would design flexibility increase value in the project? 
8. What kinds of flexibility would be useful for this project? 
 
Real Options Analysis 
1. Have you heard of Real Options Analysis? 
2. Can you explain or give examples of types of Real Options Analysis? 
3. Have you used or considered the use of Real Options Analysis to value flexibility for this 
project? 
4. Have you used Real Options Analysis previously on other projects? 
5. If so, how was this analysis conducted? 
6. How do you feel Real Options Analysis can add value to a project? 
 
Other 
1. Are you willing to participate in a follow up interview session or answer additional questions if 
necessary? 
2. Do you require that your interview remain anonymous? 
3. Do you require that any part of your interview remain confidential? 
Appendix B
"Pedagogical" model
NPV Computations: As of Time Zero (exclusive of land cost)…
NPV as Condo Project
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Year 0 1 2 3
Sales Price/Unit $236,401 $195,263 $257,698
Sales Revenue $23,640,080 $19,526,270 $25,769,770
(-) Constr & Sales Costs 15,500,000 16,000,000 16,500,000
Net Cash Flow 8,140,080 3,526,270 9,269,770
PV of Cash Flow 6,380,377 2,166,461 4,463,976
NPV (exclu land) 13,010,813
NPV as Apts Project
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Year 0 1 2 3
Sales Price/Unit $227,756 $192,368 $226,740
Sales Revenue $22,775,613 $19,236,834 $22,673,973
(-) Constr & Sales Costs 15,500,000 16,000,000 16,500,000
Net Cash Flow 7,275,613 3,236,834 6,173,973
PV of Cash Flow 5,702,788 1,988,638 2,973,156
NPV (exclu land) 10,664,581
NPV w Flexible Choise Each Phase:
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Year 0 1 2 3
Current phase developed as: CONDOS CONDOS CONDOS <==Decision Flexibility.
Sales Price/Unit $236,401 $195,263 $257,698
Sales Revenue $23,640,080 $19,526,270 $25,769,770
(-) Constr & Sales Costs 15,500,000 16,000,000 16,500,000
Net Cash Flow 8,140,080 3,526,270 9,269,770
PV of Cash Flow 6,380,377 2,166,461 4,463,976
NPV (exclu land) 13,010,813 <== Net of up-front flexibilty-enabling cost
(only applies to provide flexibility, not necessary for either type without flex).
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Appendix C – “Applied” Simulation Model 
 Exhibit 1 – Development Budget 
 Exhibit 2 – Projected Revenues 
 Exhibit 3 – Construction Schedule 
 Exhibit 4 – Projected Cash Flows 
 Exhibit 5 – Project Analysis 
 Exhibit 6 – Simulation Entries 
 Exhibit 7 – Random Number Generation 
 Exhibit 8 – NPV Calculations 
 Exhibit 9 - Simulation  
Exhibit 1
Chicago 2016 Olympic Village
Development Budget
Line Item Cost, $ Cost, $ per GSF % of Total Cost Notes
SITE ACQUISITION:
Michael Reese Hospital Parcel $85,000,000 $28.33 10.1%
Misc Closing Costs 5,000,000 $1.67 0.6%
Total Site Acquisition $90,000,000 $30.00 10.7%
HARD CONSTRUCTION COSTS:
Olympic Base Building 450,000,000 $150.00 53.3%
Miscellaneous Hard Costs 15,000,000 $5.00 1.8%
Contingency 15,000,000 $5.00 1.8%
Retrofit Costs 150,000,000 $50.00 17.8%
Total Hard Construction Costs $630,000,000 $160.00 74.7%
SOFT DEVELOPMENT COSTS:
A&E 45,000,000 $15.00 5.3%
Miscellaneous Soft Costs 60,000,000 $20.00 7.1%
Developer Fee 18,900,000 $6.30 3.0% <= based on total hard costs
Total Soft Development Costs $123,900,000 $41.30 15.4%
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT COSTS $843,900,000 $231.30 101%
Flexibility Premium 0 $0.00 0% <= based on total dvlpmt costs
Total Development Costs incl. Flexibility $843,900,000 $231.30
Gross Bldg sf 3,000,000               
Total Development Costs (excl flex & retrofit) 693,900,000
% Development Costs Allocated to Residential 80%
Total Resi Development Cost incl flex 675,120,000 <= 100% flexibility allocated to resi
Total Resi Development Cost (excl flex & retrofit) 555,120,000
Assumptions
Exhibit 2
Chicago 2016 Olympic Village
Projected Revenues
Phase 1 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 3 Phase 1 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 3
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
Use 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Luxury/Average Condo 370.00$      375.55$      381.18$      386.90$      392.70$      398.60$      444,000$      450,660$    457,420$    464,281$    471,245$    478,314$    
Luxury/Average Apartment 31.00$        31.47$        31.94$        32.42$        32.90$        33.40$        37,200$        37,758$     38,324$     38,899$     39,483$     40,075$     
Luxury Apartment Cap Rate 6.25% OpEx 11,160$      <= per year 416,640$      425,568$    434,630$    443,828$    453,164$    462,639$    
Student Housing 20.00$        20.30$        20.60$        20.91$        21.23$        21.55$        3,000$         3,045$       3,091$       3,137$       3,184$       3,232$       
Senior Housing 30.00$        30.45$        30.91$        31.37$        31.84$        32.32$        9,000$         9,135$       9,272$       9,411$       9,552$       9,696$       
Hotel 40.00$        40.60$        41.21$        41.83$        42.45$        43.09$        8,000$         8,120$       8,242$       8,365$       8,491$       8,618$       
Olympic Residential Use 15.00$        2,685$         
Apartment OpEx/RE Taxes & Comm 30%
Expected Sales/Rental Rate growth 2% /year Average Senior Room Size 300 gsf # of Apts/C 2,500         units
Average Apartment/Condo Size 1200 gsf Average Hotel /apt unit 6 rooms # of Student 20,000       units
Average Students /apt unit 8 people Average Hotel Room Size 200 gsf # of Senior 10,000       units
Average Student Room Size 150 gsf Olympic Residential Use 16,800          beds # of Hotel 15,000       units
Average Senior /apt unit 4 people Average Olympic Bed Size 179 gsf
Projected $/sf (/year) Project $/unit (/year)
Exhibit 3
Chicago 2016 Olympic Village
Construction Schedule
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL
Michael Reese Hospital Parcel 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Misc Closing Costs 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Olympic Base Building 0% 0% 10% 25% 25% 40% 0% 0% 100%
Miscellaneous Hard Costs 0% 0% 25% 25% 25% 25% 0% 0% 100%
Contingency 0% 0% 25% 25% 25% 25% 0% 0% 100%
Retrofit Costs 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100%
A&E 10% 40% 30% 5% 5% 5% 5% 0% 100%
Miscellaneous Soft Costs 10% 40% 30% 5% 5% 5% 5% 0% 100%
Developer Fee 5% 10% 15% 15% 20% 20% 15% 0% 100%
Flexibility Premium 0% 0% 0% 30% 30% 40% 0% 0% 100%
Total Development Costs 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL
Michael Reese Hospital Parcel 85,000,000                          -                -                  -                  -                  -                  -              -                  85,000,000          
Misc Closing Costs 5,000,000                           -                -                  -                  -                  -                  -              -                  5,000,000            
Olympic Base Building -                                     -                45,000,000       112,500,000     112,500,000     180,000,000     -              -                  450,000,000         
Miscellaneous Hard Costs -                                     -                3,750,000         3,750,000         3,750,000         3,750,000         -              -                  15,000,000          
Contingency -                                     -                3,750,000         3,750,000         3,750,000         3,750,000         -              -                  15,000,000          
Retrofit Costs -                                     -                -                  -                  -                  -                  -              150,000,000     150,000,000         
A&E 4,500,000                           18,000,000     13,500,000       2,250,000         2,250,000         2,250,000         2,250,000    -                  45,000,000          
Miscellaneous Soft Costs 6,000,000                           24,000,000     18,000,000       3,000,000         3,000,000         3,000,000         3,000,000    -                  60,000,000          
Developer Fee 945,000                              1,890,000       2,835,000         2,835,000         3,780,000         3,780,000         2,835,000    -                  18,900,000          
Flexibility Premium -                                     -                -                  -                  -                  -                  -              -                  -                      
Totals 101,445,000                        43,890,000     86,835,000       128,085,000     129,030,000     196,530,000     8,085,000    150,000,000     843,900,000         
Residential Development Costs ONLY 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL
Michael Reese Hospital Parcel 68,000,000                          -                -                  -                  -                  -                  -              -                  68,000,000          
Misc Closing Costs 4,000,000                           -                -                  -                  -                  -                  -              -                  4,000,000            
Olympic Base Building -                                     -                36,000,000       90,000,000       90,000,000       144,000,000     -              -                  360,000,000         
Miscellaneous Hard Costs -                                     -                3,000,000         3,000,000         3,000,000         3,000,000         -              -                  12,000,000          
Contingency -                                     -                3,000,000         3,000,000         3,000,000         3,000,000         -              -                  12,000,000          
Retrofit Costs -                                     -                -                  -                  -                  -                  -              120,000,000     120,000,000         
A&E 3,600,000                           14,400,000     10,800,000       1,800,000         1,800,000         1,800,000         1,800,000    -                  36,000,000          
Miscellaneous Soft Costs 4,800,000                           19,200,000     14,400,000       2,400,000         2,400,000         2,400,000         2,400,000    -                  48,000,000          
Developer Fee 756,000                              1,512,000       2,268,000         2,268,000         3,024,000         3,024,000         2,268,000    -                  15,120,000          
Flexibility Premium (100% allocated to resi) -                                     -                -                  -                  -                  -                  -              -                  -                      
Totals 81,156,000                          35,112,000     69,468,000       102,468,000     103,224,000     157,224,000     6,468,000    120,000,000     675,120,000         
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Projected Cash Flow
OLYMPICS Phase 1 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 3 Phase 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Calendar Years Ending: 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
CONDOS
Sales Absorption (units/year) 400 -                   -   -   -   -   -   -                   400                400                400                400                400                400                100                -                 -                 -                    
Cumulative Sales (units) -                    -   -   -   -   -   -                   400                800                1,200             1,600             2,000             2,400             2,500             2,500             2,500             2,500                
Projeted Gross Revenue (/unit) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 444,000 444,000 457,420 457,420 471,245 471,245 471,245 0 0 0
Projeted Gross Revenue 0 0 0 0 0 0 45,108,000 177,600,000 177,600,000 182,967,960 182,967,960 188,498,167 188,498,167 47,124,542 0 0 0
(-) Vacancy 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Expected Gross Revenue 0 0 0 0 0 0 45,108,000 177,600,000 177,600,000 182,967,960 182,967,960 188,498,167 188,498,167 47,124,542 0 0 0
(-) Operating Expenses & RE Taxes 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NET REVENUE 0 0 0 0 0 0 45,108,000 177,600,000 177,600,000 182,967,960 182,967,960 188,498,167 188,498,167 47,124,542 0 0 0
(-) Sales Commissions 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(-) Capital Reserve 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PROPERTY BEFORE-TAX CASH FLOW 0 0 0 0 0 0 45,108,000 177,600,000 177,600,000 182,967,960 182,967,960 188,498,167 188,498,167 47,124,542 0 0 0
NPV 9.50% 508,241,487$     
APARTMENTS
Lease up Rate (units/year) 400 -                   -   -   -   -   -   -                   400                400                400                400                400                400                100                -                 -                 -                    
Cumulative Lease up (units) -                    -   -   -   -   -   -                   400                800                1,200             1,600             2,000             2,400             2,500             2,500             2,500             2,500                
Projected Gross Revenue (/unit) -                    -   -   -   -   -   -                   416,640 416,640 434,630 434,630 453,164 453,164 453,164 0 0 0
Projeted Gross Revenue 0 0 0 0 0 0 45,108,000 166,656,000 166,656,000 173,851,968 173,851,968 181,265,434 181,265,434 45,316,359 0 0 0
(-) Vacancy 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Expected Gross Revenue 0 0 0 0 0 0 45,108,000 166,656,000 166,656,000 173,851,968 173,851,968 181,265,434 181,265,434 45,316,359 0 0 0
(-) Operating Expenses & RE Taxes 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NET OPERATING INCOME 0 0 0 0 0 0 45,108,000 166,656,000 166,656,000 173,851,968 173,851,968 181,265,434 181,265,434 45,316,359 0 0 0
(-) Leasing Commissions 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(-) Capital Reserve 0.00% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Property Before-Tax Cash Flow 0 0 0 0 0 0 45,108,000 166,656,000 166,656,000 173,851,968 173,851,968 181,265,434 181,265,434 45,316,359 0 0 0
PBTCF from reversion 7.00% 0
Sales Cost 3.00% 0
PROPERTY BEFORE-TAX CASH FLOW 0 0 0 0 0 0 45,108,000 166,656,000 166,656,000 173,851,968 173,851,968 181,265,434 181,265,434 45,316,359 0 0 0
NPV 9.50% 483,787,120$     
Chicago 2016 Olympic Village
PROJECTED NET OPERATING INCOME AND CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS
for residential components only
Construction Phase:
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Chicago 2016 Olympic Village
Project Analysis
Input Assumptions:
OCC of Spec Asset 9.50%
Stabilized Going-In IRR (2016 -> future) 8.50%
Terminal Cap Rate 7.00%
Sales Cost (%) 3.00%
NOTE: Analysis assumes a single investor and all equity.
*** all costs in thousands ('000s)
Cash Flows: OLYMPICS
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Calendar Years(Qtrs) Ending: 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
Development Cost:
Michael Reese Hospital Parcel (68,000)     -            -            -            -             -            -               -             
Misc Closing Costs (4,000)       -            -            -            -             -            -               -             
Olympic Base Building -           -            (36,000)     (90,000)     (90,000)      (144,000)   -               -             
Miscellaneous Hard Costs -           -            (3,000)       (3,000)       (3,000)        (3,000)       -               -             
Contingency -           -            (3,000)       (3,000)       (3,000)        (3,000)       -               -             
Retrofit Costs -           -            -            -            -             -            -               (120,000)    
A&E (3,600)       (14,400)     (10,800)     (1,800)       (1,800)        (1,800)       (1,800)          -             
Miscellaneous Soft Costs (4,800)       (19,200)     (14,400)     (2,400)       (2,400)        (2,400)       (2,400)          -             
Developer Fee (756)         (1,512)       (2,268)       (2,268)       (3,024)        (3,024)       (2,268)          -             
Flexibility Premium -           -            -            -            -             -            -               -             
Retrofit Cost discount for apartment vs. condo 10% -           -            -            -            -             -            -               6,000         
Total Development Costs (81,156) (35,112) (69,468) (102,468) (103,224) (157,224) (6,468) (114,000)
Projected Operations:
Projeted Gross Revenue - Condos 50% 22,554 88,800 88,800 91,484 91,484 94,249 94,249 23,562 0 0 0
Projected Gross Revenue - Apartments 50% 22,554 83,328 83,328 86,926 86,926 90,633 90,633 22,658 0 0 0
(-) Vacancy on Apartments 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Expected Gross Revenue 45,108 172,128 172,128 178,410 178,410 184,882 184,882 46,220 0 0 0
(-) Operating Expenses & RE Taxes - Condos 50% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(-) Operating Expenses & RE Taxes - Apartments 50% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NET REVENUE/NET OPERATING INCOME 45,108 172,128 172,128 178,410 178,410 184,882 184,882 46,220 0 0 0
(-) Sales Commissions - Condos 50% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(-) Leasing Commissions - Apartments 50% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(-) Capital Reserve - Condos 50% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(-) Capital Reserve - Apartments 50% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PROPERTY BEFORE-TAX CASH FLOW 45,108 172,128 172,128 178,410 178,410 184,882 184,882 46,220 0 0
PBTCF from Reversion 7.00% 0
Sales Cost 3.00% -             
PBTCF Total (Olympic/Retrofit/Stabilized Phases) 45,108 172,128 172,128 178,410 178,410 184,882 184,882 46,220 0 0
PBTCF Total (all phases): IRR = 9.92% (81,156) (35,112) (69,468) (102,468) (103,224) (157,224) 38,640 58,128 172,128 178,410 178,410 184,882 184,882 46,220 0 0
Development Phase Cash Flows: IRR = 11.49% (81,156) (35,112) (69,468) (102,468) (103,224) (157,224) 769,232
Total Development Costs (excluding flex and retrofit) (81,156) (35,112) (69,468) (102,468) (103,224) (157,224) (6,468)
Total Flexibility Costs -           -            -            -            -             -            -               
PV of TDC (excl. flex and retrofit, incl. Olympic Revenue) 9.92% (420,134) (695,829)
PV of Total Flexibility Costs 9.92% 0 0
Retrofit: Stabilized Operational Phase:Construction Phase:
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Chicago 2016 Olympic Village
Simulation Entries
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Base
Condo Base Absorption Rate, units/yr 400 400 400 400
Apt Base Absorption Rate, units/yr 400 400 400 400
Condo Absorption Uncertainty Factor 40% 40% 40% 40%
Apt Absorption Uncertainty Factor 10% 10% 10% 10%
Condo Actual Change in Absrptn Rate, % -4.09% 1.30% 7.24%
Apt Actual Change in Absrptn Rate, % -0.13% -1.11% 4.38%
Occupancy Hurdle Rate, % 80% 80% 80% 80%
Condo Absorption Rate, units/yr 384 405 429
Apt Absorption Rate, units/yr 399 396 418
Max years per Phase 3 <= must be 1, 2 or 3 years 3
Absorption Weight Factor 30% 30%
NOTE: correlation between condos and apartments is already considered below
** factor for correlation with change in condo prices (i.e. as price goes up, so does absorption)
Option to Defer ON OFF
Years per Phase 1.67                             2 <= rounded to # of full years to achieve occupancy hurdle rate
*** assumes condo absorption rate for Phase 1
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Base
Units Developed (each phase) 800 800 900 800
Residential Construction Cost (as of Olympic delivery):
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Base Cost $278,332 $278,332 $278,332 per unit
Added Cost to Retrofit & Sell:
As Condos $48,000 $51,000 $54,000 per unit 3% <= increase per year
As Apts $45,600 $48,000 $51,000 per unit 10% <= % discount to cost of condo finishes
Up-front Cost to Enable Flexibility $0 per unit
Selling Price Expectations: 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
As Condos $444,000 $457,420 $471,245 per unit
As Apts $416,640 $434,630 $453,164 per unit
Uncertainty Factor in Price*:
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Base
As Condos 40% 40% 40% 40%
As Apts 10% 10% 10% 10%
Price Weight Factor 30% <= to model correlation 30%
*Note: Bivariate Triangular Distribution. Inputs here are extreme ranges for raw uncorrelated distns and correlation weight.
Weight factor is similar to correlation but lower. Standard deviations will be lower than extreme ranges.
Standard deviation of "Apts" distribution will be even lower as a function of the weighting factor.
OCC Project Level 9.92% Project IRR <= select from dropdown list
Development IRR 11.49% <==Note: Calculated from Resi Analysis (static)
Project IRR 9.92% <==Note: Calculated from Resi Analysis (static)
Override IRR 15.00%
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Chicago 2016 Olympic Village
Random Number Generation
As Condos
As Apts
Min Max Min Max Min Max
As Condos 266,400$        621,600$        274,452$        640,388$        282,747$        659,744$        
As Apts 374,976$        458,304$        391,167$        478,093$        407,847$        498,480$        
Baseline Price: Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
As Condos $444,000 $457,420 $471,245
As Apts $416,640 $434,630 $453,164
Random Price: Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
As Condos $438,971 $338,386 $349,772 -1.1% -26.0% -25.8%
As Apts $405,289 $428,589 $439,968 -2.7% -1.4% -2.9%
1 2 3 -3% -65% -64%
Actual % change from baseline
+/- 40%
Uncertainty Factor Ph1
+/- 10%
Uncertainty Factor Ph2
+/- 40%
+/- 10%
Uncertainty Factor Ph3
+/- 40%
+/- 10%
Demand Simulator
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Chicago 2016 Olympic Village
NPV Calculations as of Time Zero (2016)
Years per phase 2.00
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
NPV as Condo Project Phase Units Absorp Sales $/unit Phase  Phase 1 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 4 Phase 4
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Sales Price/Unit 1 438,971 438,971 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 338,386 338,386 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 349,772 349,772 0 0 0
Sales Revenue 1 800 384 438,971 0 168,564,942 168,564,942 14,047,079 0 0 0 0 0 0 $351,176,963
p1c 168,564,942 337,129,885 351,176,963 351,176,963 351,176,963 351,176,963 351,176,963 351,176,963 351,176,963
units/year 0 384 384 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 800                          
total units phase 1 384 768 800 800 800 800 800 800 800
2 800 405 338,386 0 0 126,218,052 137,046,410 7,444,496 0 0 0 0 $270,708,958
p2c 0 0 126,218,052 263,264,462 270,708,958 270,708,958 270,708,958 270,708,958 270,708,958
units/year 0 0 0 373 405 22 0 0 0 0 800                          
total units phase 2 0 0 373 778 800 800 800 800 800
3 900 429 349,772 0 0 0 0 142,357,349 150,052,341 22,385,431 0 0 $314,795,121
p3c 0 0 0 0 142,357,349 292,409,690 314,795,121 314,795,121 314,795,121
units/year 0 0 0 0 0 407 429 64 0 0 900                          
total units phase 3 0 0 0 0 407 836 900 900 900
total units /year 384 384 405 405 429 429 64 0 0 2,500                      
Constr & Sales Costs 1 ‐38,400,000 ‐222,665,285 ‐38,400,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 ‐40,800,000 ‐222,665,285 0 0 ‐40,800,000 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 ‐48,600,000 ‐250,498,446 0 0 0 0 ‐48,600,000 0 0 0 0
Net Cash Flow ALL ‐695,829,016 130,164,942 168,564,942 99,465,130 137,046,410 101,201,846 150,052,341 22,385,431 0 0
1 ‐222,665,285 130,164,942 168,564,942 14,047,079 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 ‐222,665,285 0 0 85,418,052 137,046,410 7,444,496 0 0 0 0
3 ‐250,498,446 0 0 0 0 93,757,349 150,052,341 22,385,431 0 0
PV of Yearly Cash Flow ALL ‐695,829,016 118,420,908 139,519,839 74,898,638 93,886,918 63,075,428 85,084,197 11,547,978 0 0 ‐109,395,110
PV of Phase Cash Flow ALL 45,853,109 0 ‐59,817,492 0 ‐95,430,726 0 0 0 0 ‐109,395,110
NPV of Condo Alternative ‐109,395,110
NPV as Apt Project Phase Units Absorp Sales $/unit Phase 1 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 4 Phase 4
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Sales Price/Unit 1 405,289 405,289 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 428,589 428,589 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 439,968 439,968 0 0 0
Sales Revenue 1 800 399 405,289 161,710,227 161,710,227 810,578 0 0 0 0 0 0 $324,231,032
p1c 161,710,227 323,420,454 324,231,032 324,231,032 324,231,032 324,231,032 324,231,032 324,231,032 324,231,032
units/year 0 399 399 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 800                          
total units phase 1 399 798 800 800 800 800 800 800 800
2 800 396 428,589 0 0 168,863,909 169,721,086 4,285,886 0 0 0 0 $342,870,881
p2c 0 0 168,863,909 338,584,995 342,870,881 342,870,881 342,870,881 342,870,881 342,870,881
units/year 0 0 0 394 396 10 0 0 0 0 800                          
total units phase 2 0 0 394 790 800 800 800 800 800
3 900 418 439,968 0 0 0 0 179,506,831 183,906,508 32,557,612 0 0 $395,970,951
p3c 0 0 0 0 179,506,831 363,413,339 395,970,951 395,970,951 395,970,951
units/year 0 0 0 0 0 408 418 74 0 0 900                          
total units phase 3 0 0 0 0 408 826 900 900 900
total units /year 399 399 396 396 418 418 74 0 0 2,500                      
Constr & Sales Costs 1 ‐36,480,000 ‐222,665,285 ‐36,480,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 ‐38,400,000 ‐222,665,285 0 0 ‐38,400,000 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 ‐45,900,000 ‐250,498,446 0 0 0 0 ‐45,900,000 0 0 0 0
Net Cash Flow ALL ‐695,829,016 125,230,227 161,710,227 131,274,487 169,721,086 137,892,717 183,906,508 32,557,612 0 0
1 ‐222,665,285 125,230,227 161,710,227 810,578 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 ‐222,665,285 0 0 130,463,909 169,721,086 4,285,886 0 0 0 0
3 ‐250,498,446 0 0 0 0 133,606,831 183,906,508 32,557,612 0 0
PV of Yearly Cash Flow ALL ‐695,829,016 113,931,423 133,846,247 98,851,529 116,271,486 85,943,513 104,280,530 16,795,503 0 0 ‐25,908,784
PV of Phase Cash Flow ALL 25,722,761 0 ‐5,481,409 0 ‐46,150,136 0 0 0 0 ‐25,908,784
NPV of Apt Alternative ‐25,908,784
NPV w Flexible Choise Each Phase: Phase 1 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 4 Phase 4
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
NPV of Condo Phase Cash Flow 45,853,109 0 ‐59,817,492 0 ‐95,430,726 0 0 0 0
NPV of Apt Phase Cash Flow 25,722,761 0 ‐5,481,409 0 ‐46,150,136 0 0 0 0
Current phase developed as: CONDOS n/a APTS n/a APTS n/a n/a n/a n/a
PV of Flexible Cash Flow 45,853,109$           ‐$                         ‐5,481,409$            ‐$                         ‐46,150,136$         ‐$                         ‐$                         ‐$                         ‐$                        
NPV of Flexible Alternative ‐5,778,437 <== Net of up‐front flexibilty‐enabling cost (only applies to provide flexibility, not necessary for either type without flex).
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Simulation Results
NPVs as of Time 0 (2016) ‐  (2000 simulated future outcomes) Press F9 key to run. Note: Data/Table (simulation) is on this page.
Condo Only Apt Only Flexible
Mean 20,330,111 -11,353,623 58,384,993
Max 267,729,540 31,387,203 267,729,540
Min -226,820,930 -58,449,366 -58,449,366
STD 80,448,842 14,457,641 55,152,417
Condo Only Apt Only Flexible
NPVs ‐109,395,110 ‐25,908,784 ‐5,778,437 <== N 0
0.01 48,896,820          ‐14,846,407        48,896,820
0.01 ‐37,668,559        ‐19,038,027        86,022,039
0.01 147,537,510       24,252,781          147,537,510
0.01 ‐44,509,570        ‐2,412,191           6,813,104
0.01 11,986,880          ‐31,428,127        66,463,881
0.01 68,194,398          ‐761,893             68,194,398
0.01 65,035,626          ‐31,857,079        65,035,626
0.01 66,456,456          5,442,414            131,242,454
0.01 26,326,192          ‐5,883,281           71,320,161
0.01 ‐26,640,385        ‐770,481             30,991,184
0.01 22,610,835          ‐9,988,651           75,058,408
0.01 93,723,240          ‐9,363,559           93,723,240
0.01 77,935,365          ‐11,345,018        77,935,365
0.01 ‐138,127,309      ‐33,125,755        ‐33,125,755
0.01 137,002,344       17,873,577          140,728,070
0.01 170,494,675       8,584,712            170,494,675
0.01 15,767,755          ‐12,119,443        79,240,589 Condos Only
0.01 85,040,800          ‐25,568,134        109,167,945 10% ‐85,377,264 million $
0.01 ‐16,001,839        ‐24,057,405        29,414,884 10% 127,261,996 million $
0.01 20,377,179          ‐10,061,604        63,116,463 Apts Only
0.01 ‐53,696,603        ‐21,982,252        25,577,491 10% ‐29,393,262 million $
0.01 89,594,742          ‐19,997,222        89,594,742 10% 7,063,709 million $
0.01 50,474,146          ‐641,716             102,065,048 Flexible
0.01 4,374,701            11,995,470          74,316,947 10% ‐6,811,827 million $
0.01 ‐62,250,987        ‐17,842,204        6,077,680 10% 134,960,362 million $
0.01 58,927,722          8,312,134            84,549,157
0.01 220,724,157       22,613,538          220,724,157 Means graphing:
0.01 ‐67,037,250        1,776,101            22,969,881 20,330,111 1 ‐11,353,623 1 58,384,993 1
0.01 ‐78,730,280        ‐45,247,997        ‐42,961,514 20,330,111 0 ‐11,353,623 0 58,384,993 0
0.01 43,307,881          ‐3,713,582           72,632,195
0.01 ‐54,128,753        ‐11,729,901        16,595,823
0.01 ‐72,957,719        ‐23,886,363        19,514,268
0.01 ‐62,686,927        ‐28,726,770        13,579,822
0.01 90,017,783          ‐4,221,400           90,017,783
0.01 59,043,306          ‐15,665,218        59,256,475
0.01 113,770,010       8,547,485            150,112,407
0.01 3,745,417            ‐34,615,757        45,354,132
0.01 56,190,092          ‐17,654,934        64,644,954
0.01 ‐13,646,247        ‐54,255,907        ‐6,814,363
0.01 35,893,996          24,552,271          55,456,165
0.01 52,135,473          ‐33,530,930        61,337,634
0.01 28,088,144          ‐16,754,733        34,846,441
0.01 ‐20,579,107        ‐8,296,131           19,645,762
0.01 ‐72,147,658        ‐10,076,126        16,664,793
0.01 13,450,965          ‐1,261,954           64,929,792
0.01 77,807,606          ‐23,484,752        77,807,606
0.01 ‐38,213,472        ‐6,904,939           5,106,805
0.01 ‐45,021,977        4,112,318            12,787,946
0.01 77,252,515          ‐15,027,623        77,252,515
0.01 ‐56,967,187        ‐2,398,663           5,091,601
0.01 45,133,681          ‐15,961,385        56,405,919
0.01 12,064,702          ‐22,005,551        84,802,314
0.01 ‐74,852,865        ‐4,223,299           10,044,328
0.01 106,522,723       ‐16,069,982        107,595,783 Mean Max Min StD
0.01 40,728,338          ‐15,288,560        55,490,070 20,330,111 267,729,540 -226,820,930 80,448,842
0.01 ‐6,121,214           12,456,183          34,642,612
0.01 7,623,080            ‐8,745,301           26,321,799
0.01 ‐99,254,399        ‐9,682,144           26,314,599
0.01 12,246,842          565,710               63,796,466
0.01 ‐59,324,067        ‐33,553,726        27,001,625
0.01 30,275,011          11,999,070          34,186,216
0.01 174,257,546       ‐15,383,371        174,257,546
0.01 ‐83,280,865        ‐19,395,738        ‐19,395,738
0.01 14,635,834          ‐4,313,577           52,806,621
0.01 37,011,181          ‐1,363,355           99,856,313
0.01 111,315,807       ‐20,094,325        121,288,332
0.01 156,880,951       4,945,659            156,880,951
0.01 ‐66,374,582        ‐35,762,256        6,652,135
0.01 ‐25,581,477        ‐30,927,619        30,151,299
0.01 148,879,783       ‐30,132,544        148,879,783
0.01 15,261,806          522,805               39,647,077
0.01 42,157,618          ‐21,251,789        49,881,422
0.01 18,034,705          ‐36,739,717        23,639,969
0.01 45,134,461          16,331,240          81,525,083
0.01 ‐180,356,925      ‐21,291,269        ‐21,291,269
0.01 ‐140,630,882      4,111,398            4,111,398
0.01 ‐23,676,055        ‐34,283,761        16,832,479
0.01 ‐66,346,302        ‐35,708,864        ‐12,313,229
0.01 ‐15,621,658        ‐9,478,817           35,774,439
0.01 ‐114,266,931      ‐23,183,515        ‐4,181,758
0.01 ‐6,897,575           ‐26,393,648        ‐586,632 Mean Max Min StD
0.01 2,527,624            ‐7,796,885           70,979,835 -11,353,623 31,387,203 -58,449,366 14,457,641
0.01 126,686,528       ‐20,891,226        147,823,311
0.01 ‐10,274,334        15,636,396          28,129,540
0.01 ‐66,990,817        ‐23,692,212        12,926,923
0.01 ‐73,796,608        ‐15,181,793        ‐15,181,793
0.01 ‐4,766,398           ‐30,318,064        42,539,547
0.01 10,270,004          ‐6,971,987           32,853,733
0.01 ‐109,185,743      ‐6,766,357           ‐6,766,357
0.01 ‐57,808,034        ‐11,052,054        16,285,464
0.01 77,068,567          31,135,181          135,677,374
0.01 14,317,267          ‐10,034,285        30,577,279
0.01 50,710,105          ‐14,549,256        94,834,172
0.01 43,132,704          ‐13,877,751        80,319,877
0.01 ‐30,243,666        ‐10,354,228        ‐5,666,612
0.01 ‐7,331,925           ‐9,820,943           31,579,459
0.01 ‐38,011,708        ‐1,998,734           54,480,083
0.01 ‐39,435,694        ‐21,918,167        23,722,149
0.01 ‐16,593,822        12,581,336          25,164,674
0.01 81,736,359          ‐12,964,312        112,080,435
0.01 ‐39,603,005        445,077               445,077
0.01 90,336,678          ‐30,381,033        92,697,055
0.01 84,582,950          ‐8,088,229           90,461,070
0.01 ‐110,195,760      ‐33,859,643        8,477,698
0.01 111,658,121       325,471               124,772,607
0.01 78,115,024          ‐13,252,990        132,730,652
0.01 71,798,467          ‐18,752,468        71,798,467 Mean Max Min StD
0.01 ‐104,033,570      ‐4,753,797           ‐4,753,797 Condo 20,330,111 267,729,540 -226,820,930 80,448,842
0.01 ‐138,384,746      ‐21,409,486        ‐21,409,486 Apt -11,353,623 31,387,203 -58,449,366 14,457,641
0.01 128,926,530       1,103,396            129,898,011
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Histogram - NPVs Condos Only
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Histogram - NPVs Apts Only
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